Jihye Jeon

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Education

New York University Stern School of Business
Ph.D., Economics, 2011-2017 (expected)

Yale University
A.B., Economics with Honors, 2005-2009

References

Professor Luis Cabral (co-chair)
Department of Economics, NYU Stern
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Professor Ariel Pakes (co-chair)
Department of Economics, Harvard University
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Professor John Asker
Department of Economics, UCLA
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Professor Robin Lee
Department of Economics, Harvard University
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Research Fields

Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics

Research Experience and Other Employment

2012-2014	Research Assistant to Professor John Asker, NYU Stern
2009-2011	Research Assistant, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
2008-2009	Research Assistant to Professor Heather Tookes, Yale School of Management
2007-2008	Research Assistant to Professor Alessandro Gavazza, Yale School of Management

Teaching Experience

Fall 2014	Teaching Assistant for Microeconomics I (Undergraduate), NYU Stern
Fall 2014	Instructor for PhD Math Camp, NYU Stern
Spring 2014	Teaching Assistant for Firms and Markets (MBA), NYU Stern

Presentations

2016	IIOC (Philadelphia), EARIE (Lisbon)
2015	NYU Stern Applied Micro Seminar, Harvard Research in Industrial Organization

Professional Activities

Refereeing: RAND Journal of Economics

Discussions: NET Institute Conference (2015), IIOC (2016)

Scholarships and Fellowships

2015-2016	Paul I. Willensky Fellowship
2015	Center for Global Economy and Business Research Grant
2011-2014	Doctoral Fellowship, NYU Stern
2008	Yale University Summer Research Awards
2007	Richard U. Light Fellowship

Research Papers

Learning and Investment under Demand Uncertainty in Container Shipping **(Job Market Paper)**

This paper develops a dynamic oligopoly model of investment to investigate how firms invest under demand fluctuations and what drives boom-and-bust cycles of investment. I depart from the standard assumption that firms know the true model of demand and its parameters. Instead, I allow firms to form and revise expectations about demand based on information available at each decision-making moment. I estimate the model using firm-level data from the container shipping industry. Results show that a model with learning successfully predicts the boom-bust investment patterns observed in the data, while a full-information model fails to do so. Counterfactual experiments reveal that (i) strategic incentives play an important role in creating oversupply, as well as increasing the volatility of investment; (ii) scrapping subsidies can reduce excess capacity but cause a loss in consumer surplus; and (iii) under learning higher demand volatility leads to more drastic revisions of beliefs, which amplifies investment boom-bust cycles. I show that the regulator's modeling choice for firms' expectations has important policy implications, namely in merger evaluation.

The Competitive Effects of Information Sharing (joint with John Asker, Chaim Fershtman, and Ariel Pakes)

We investigate the impact of information sharing between rivals in a dynamic auction with asymmetric information. Firms bid in sequential auctions to obtain inputs. Their inventory of inputs, determined by the results of past auctions, are privately known state variables that determine bidding incentives. The model is analyzed numerically under different information sharing rules. The analysis uses the restricted experience based equilibrium concept of Fershtman and Pakes (2012) which we refine to mitigate multiplicity issues. We find that increased information about competitors' states increases participation and inventories, as the firms are more able to avoid the intense competition in low inventory states. While average bids are lower, social welfare is unchanged and output is increased. Implications for the posture of antitrust regulation toward information sharing agreements are discussed.