

Controlling versus enabling*

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Abstract

Revenue sharing between principals and agents is commonly used to balance double-sided moral hazard. We provide a theory of how, when such revenue-sharing is optimal, a principal allocates control rights over costly decisions that either party could make. We explore how contractibility of the decisions underlying double-sided moral hazard, the importance of the principal's moral hazard relative to the agent's, and spillovers across multiple agents affect the principal's optimal allocation of control rights. The theory implies a simple rule on revenue shares that courts could use to help determine whether professionals operate more like employees or independent contractors.

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1 Introduction

A key decision for many firms is whether to control the provision of services to customers by employing workers or whether to enable independent contractors to take control of service provision. This decision has been relevant in some industries for a long time—such as manufacturers and sales agents. However, it has become more prominent in recent times, reflecting that in a rapidly increasing number of service industries (e.g. consulting, education, home services, legal, outsourcing, staffing, and taxi

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services), online platforms have emerged to take advantage of information and remote collaboration technologies to enable independent professionals to directly connect with customers (e.g. Coursera, Gerson Lehrman Group, Hourly Nerd, Task Rabbit, Uber, and Upwork). These firms typically differ from their more traditional counterparts by letting professionals control some or all of the relevant decision rights, such as prices, expenditure on equipment, and marketing of the professionals' skills and services. This contrast motivates our theoretical study of a principal's choice of whether to keep decision authority or to grant it to an agent.

In these settings, the revenues generated by the principal typically depend on both its ongoing investments (e.g. in the quality of its product or technological infrastructure) and those made by the agent (e.g. the effort the agent puts into providing a high quality service). When neither the principal's nor the agent's investments are contractible, joint production calls for some sharing of revenues between the principal and the agent to help balance the resulting double-sided moral hazard problem. At the same time, as noted above, there are other non-contractible decisions which also affect revenues but can be controlled by either the principal or the agent. In this paper, we study the optimal allocation of control rights over these transferable decision variables, taking into account the underlying double-sided moral hazard problem.

To do so, we develop a model that contains three types of non-contractible decisions: two sets of costly and non-transferable investment decisions—one for the principal and one for the agent—and a set of transferable decisions, each element of which can be controlled by either the principal or the agent. In our model, linear contracts, in which the agent receives a share of the revenue it generates as well as a fixed payment (that could be negative), are optimal. Since revenues must be shared between the principal and the agent to incentivize their respective non-transferable investments, no allocation of control rights will achieve the first-best.

Our analysis yields three main sets of results. First, we prove a baseline result: when there are no (or sufficiently small) cost differences between the principal and the agent in undertaking transferable actions, control rights over these actions should all be given to the same party (principal or agent), namely the party that obtains the higher revenue share in equilibrium. In other words, low-powered incentives (i.e. control over the transferable decisions) should be aligned with high-powered incentives (i.e. higher share of revenues) in order to minimize revenue-sharing distortions. An implication of this result is that the principal only has to choose between two modes of organization: what we call the \mathcal{P} -mode, in which the principal keeps control over all transferable decisions (this can be interpreted as employment), and what we call the \mathcal{A} -mode, in which the principal gives control over all transferable decisions to the agent (this can be interpreted as independent contracting). This result does not rely on interaction effects among the various decisions in the revenue function, or on cost economies of scope across transferable decisions.

Second, we study the effects on the choice between the \mathcal{P} -mode and \mathcal{A} -mode of changing (i) the contractibility of the agent's and the principal's non-transferable investments, and (ii) the importance of the agent's moral hazard relative to the principal's. Common intuition would suggest that making one of the agent's non-transferable investments contractible always shifts the tradeoff in favor of the

\mathcal{P} -mode. Indeed, eliminating one of the sources of moral hazard for the agent should imply that there is less need to give the agent low-powered incentives, i.e. control over transferable actions. While this is true when the revenue function is fully additively separable, we show that the result can be overturned if there are positive interaction effects across the agent’s non-transferable decisions, leading to a counter-intuitive conclusion. This is due to a countervailing effect: rendering one of the agent’s non-transferable investments contractible means it can be set at a higher (and therefore more efficient) level, which in turn increases the marginal gains from raising the agent’s remaining non-transferable and non-contractible investments through the positive interaction effects. Thus, the benefit of giving the agent low-powered incentives increases.

An increase in the agent’s moral hazard—by which we mean an increase in the weight placed on the *profit* generated by the agent’s non-transferable investments in the principal’s overall profit—results in a shift towards the \mathcal{A} -mode. The logic is straightforward. In the optimal \mathcal{A} -mode contract, the agent keeps a larger share of revenue than in the optimal \mathcal{P} -mode contract, which means the \mathcal{A} -mode is better at generating profit from the agent’s non-transferable investments. However, if instead what increases is the extent to which *revenue* depends on the agent’s non-transferable investments, then the tradeoff does not necessarily shift in favor of the \mathcal{A} -mode. In this case, there is an additional effect which can run in the opposite direction: the equilibrium levels of the agent’s non-transferable investments may increase by a larger amount in the \mathcal{P} -mode than in the \mathcal{A} -mode.

Third and finally, we study the choice between \mathcal{P} -mode and \mathcal{A} -mode when there are multiple agents and spillovers across the transferable decisions of different agents. In this case, the spillover-induced distortion shifts the baseline tradeoff between \mathcal{P} -mode and \mathcal{A} -mode by either exacerbating the revenue-sharing distortion (which favors the \mathcal{P} -mode) or offsetting it (which favors the \mathcal{A} -mode). The latter scenario leads to some counter-intuitive results.

For example, consider the case when the transferable decision is a revenue-increasing, costly investment (e.g. giving kickbacks to clients) and the spillovers are negative (e.g. a sales agent of a given manufacturer steals business from the manufacturer’s other sales agents by giving clients greater kickbacks). In \mathcal{A} -mode, individual agents invest too much by not fully internalizing the spillovers. However, these higher investments can help offset the revenue-sharing distortion, namely that the party with control rights invests too little because it keeps less than 100% of the revenue generated. The \mathcal{A} -mode can then be a useful way for the principal to get agents to choose higher levels of the transferable decision variable without giving them an excessively high share of revenues. This mechanism has two counterintuitive consequences. First, when negative spillovers are not too large in magnitude, an increase in their magnitude shifts the tradeoff in favor of the \mathcal{A} -mode—the opposite of the standard “internalize externalities” logic. Second, if the magnitude of negative spillovers is sufficiently large, then agents get a lower share of revenues in \mathcal{A} -mode than in \mathcal{P} -mode and therefore the \mathcal{A} -mode (respectively, the \mathcal{P} -mode) is more likely to be chosen when the principal’s (respectively, the agents’) moral hazard becomes more important. This is the opposite of the standard “give control to the party whose investments are more important” prediction, which prevails when spillovers are positive.

A similar logic also applies when the transferable decision is the price charged to customers. In this case, the principal prefers the \mathcal{A} -mode when spillovers are moderately negative. Indeed, negative spillovers lead agents to set prices too high in \mathcal{A} -mode, but this mitigates the double-sided moral hazard problem by raising the return to the agent's and the principal's non-transferable investments.

Our theory provides a natural way to conceptualize the fundamental difference between traditional firms that hire employees and platforms that enable independent contractors to interact with customers, based on the allocation of control rights between the firm and workers over decisions that affect the revenues generated from customers. Simply put, firms that allocate more control rights to workers are closer to the platform/marketplace model. In addition to being intuitively appealing, this conceptualization leads to two important predictions. Specifically, (i) unless each party (firm and workers) has significant cost or information advantages for some transferable actions, one should observe that control rights over costly transferable actions are all allocated to the same party, and (ii) when spillovers across agents are not important, firms that have chosen the \mathcal{A} -mode (independent contracting) should leave more than 50% of their variable revenues to agents, while firms that have chosen the \mathcal{P} -mode (employment) should leave less than 50% of their variable revenues to agents. This can also lead to a practical test of whether workers are employees or independent contractors (based on the share of revenues they retain) that could be useful for the courts.

The next section discusses related literature. Section 3 provides some examples of markets in which the allocation of control rights we study is relevant. Section 4 provides a general analysis of the case with a principal and a single agent, in which there are multiple decisions of each type (transferable, non-transferable for the agent and non-transferable for the principal). In Section 5, we study the case with one principal, multiple agents, one decision of each type and spillovers across the transferable decisions of different agents. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 Related literature

Our paper provides a theory of decision authority. As such it relates to both the literature on the theory-of-the-firm and the literature on decision-making within organizations.

In our model, we use elements from the formal theories of the firm based on property rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990) and incentive systems (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994). However, our approach is different in two key respects.

First, we do not tie the choice of which party holds decision authority to the ownership of assets. In the Grossman-Hart-Moore framework, the tradeoff between employment and independent contracting is driven by the split of asset ownership. This determines the ex-post payoffs earned by the various parties from their respective outside options, which in turn determines their ex-ante incentives to make relationship-specific investments. By contrast, in our paper, the difference between employment and independent contracting is defined by the allocation of control rights over non-contractible decisions that are chosen ex-post and affect joint payoffs.¹ The tradeoff between the two governance modes is

¹Viewing employees as agents who have contractually agreed that control over certain transferable decisions (e.g.

then driven by double-sided moral hazard—outside options are irrelevant as there are no assets to own and no ex-post negotiation.

Thus, consistent with the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) incentive system framework and with empirical findings (e.g. Baker and Hubbard, 2004; Simester and Wernerfelt, 2005), our paper shifts the focus from ex-ante specific investments towards moral hazard. The main difference with respect to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) is that we allow some decision rights to be shifted between the principal and the agent, whereas in their framework decision rights cannot be transferred (only the agent makes non-contractible decisions). This means that the key questions we focus on—namely, how to optimally allocate decision rights and how the optimal allocation changes with contractibility, moral hazard and spillovers—are not addressed in their framework. While Holmstrom and Milgrom do allow the principal to determine asset ownership and exclusion from private returns (e.g. deciding whether agents can sell to third parties), these are incentive instruments that only determine the agents’ incentives based on changes in the returns that the agent obtains. Thus, the difference between employment and independent contracting in their paper is determined by revenue shares, asset ownership, private returns and private costs, whereas in our model it is determined solely by revenue shares and the allocation of decision rights. This also means their finding of a positive correlation between commissions paid to agents and asset ownership by agents is quite different from our result that control rights over transferable decisions should be given to the party that obtains the higher revenue share. In particular, Holmstrom and Milgrom’s result relies on supermodularity of the agent’s effort supply function, whereas our colocation result holds even if the effects of the various efforts are completely separable (indeed, negative interaction effects are allowed). Van den Steen (2010a and b) also contain results regarding the colocation of residual income and control, but they are driven by uncertainty and differing priors between the two parties. In contrast, ours is driven by double-sided moral hazard and revenue-sharing considerations.

Second, unlike most of the theory of the firm literature (property rights as well as incentive systems), we also explore the role of spillovers created by the transferable decisions corresponding to each agent on the payoffs generated by the other agents. These spillovers are internalized when the principal controls the transferable decisions, but not when they are controlled by agents. In particular, our spillovers are different from Hart and Moore (1990)’s strategic complementarities across investments. In their framework, changes in asset ownership can only affect ex-ante investment incentives if they modify the (positive) effect of an agent’s investment on the marginal investment return of other agents in some coalition of agents. By contrast, as we show with a linear example in Section 5.1, our spillovers affect the tradeoff we study even when an agent’s investment decision has no effect on other agents’ marginal returns on investment.

Our framework also relates to the literature on decision authority within organizations (e.g. Aghion and Tirole, 1997, Alonso et al., 2008, Bester, 2009). Specifically, one can view the principal in our model as an owner and manager of a firm deciding on the allocation of decision rights between herself

equipment, pricing) be given to the firm avoids Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) well-known critique of Coase (1937), namely that there is no meaningful distinction between the authority that a firm has over employees and the authority it has over suppliers or other external contractors.

and an employee (and on the corresponding compensation structure), in a context in which both parties must make on-going investments that affect total revenues generated. A key difference relative to this literature is that in our model the misalignment of objectives between principal and agent is endogenously determined by the principal's choice of revenue sharing (which in turn is driven by the underlying double-sided moral hazard problem). By contrast, most of this literature typically assumes exogenously given misalignments of objectives between the various parties involved. Furthermore, the driving forces in our model are the distortions due to double-sided moral hazard and spillovers, whereas the existing literature on decision authority focuses on uncertainty, information asymmetries and cheap talk. While this literature does sometimes incorporate (single-sided) moral hazard issues, these papers still rely on other sources of distortion, such as liquidity constraints (Zábojník, 2002) or exogenously given misalignment of objectives (Bester and Krähmer, 2008). As such, the set-ups and mechanisms are very different from ours.

Some of our main results run counter to the conventional intuition derived from the theory-of-the-firm and delegation literatures. Specifically, the effect of making one of the agent's non-transferable investments contractible on the allocation of control rights in our framework is richer than and can be the opposite of existing results, which predict that increasing the contractibility of the agent's actions would optimally shift ownership of productive assets to the principal (see, for example, Wernerfelt, 2002, Baker and Hubbard, 2004). Similarly, our finding that negative spillovers can make the principal more likely to prefer giving control over transferable actions to the agents as the magnitude of spillovers increases or as the principal's moral hazard becomes more important relative to the agents' is the opposite of what one would expect based on standard agency theory or Grossman and Hart's (1986) prediction that ownership over assets (and therefore control) should be given to the party whose investment incentives are more important.

Since in our model revenues must be shared between the principal and the agent to incentivize both sides to make non-contractible investments, we also directly build upon principal-agent models with double-sided moral hazard (Romano, 1994, Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995). The key difference relative to these papers is that we introduce a third type of non-contractible decision, control over which can be allocated to either the principal or the agents. We also generalize these settings by allowing each type of decision variable to be multi-dimensional.

Finally, this paper relates to our earlier works that study how firms choose to position themselves closer to or further from a multi-sided platform business model. The focus on incentives and double-sided moral hazard in the current paper differs from the one in Hagiú and Wright (2015a), where the tradeoff between operating as a marketplace or as a reseller was driven by the importance of agents' local information relative to the firm's. Here we abstract from information asymmetries. Closer to our current model is Hagiú and Wright (2015b), which derives a tradeoff between a vertically integrated mode and a multi-sided platform mode based on a number of different factors including the agents' moral hazard. A key difference relative to Hagiú and Wright (2015b) is the introduction of double-sided moral hazard, which is fundamental to the tradeoffs that we study here. Another difference is that the current model is much more general, and applies to a wider range of organizations rather

than just multi-sided platforms facing cross-group network effects.

3 Examples

There are many industries in which the choice that we study is relevant. An important set of industries involves firms that can either employ professionals and control how they deliver services to clients, or operate as marketplaces enabling independent professionals to provide services directly to clients. This choice is relevant to both Internet-based service platforms (e.g. Coursera, Handy, Hourly Nerd, Lyft and Uber, Rubicon Global, Task Rabbit, and Upwork) and to firms operating in a number of “offline” industries.²

The hair salon industry is a good example, as it has long featured two modes of organization, that can be viewed as corresponding to our \mathcal{P} -mode and \mathcal{A} -mode respectively. Some salons employ their hairstylists and pay them fixed hourly wages plus commissions that are a percentage of sales. Such salons control how individual hair dressers are promoted, provide most of the supplies and equipment that stylists use for hair cutting and styling, and determine prices (\mathcal{P} -mode). In contrast, other salons rent out chairs (booths) to independent hairstylists. The stylists keep all earnings minus fixed monthly booth rental fees that are paid to the salon. In such salons, individual hair stylists promote themselves, are responsible for providing and maintaining the majority of the supplies and equipment they need, and choose their prices individually (\mathcal{A} -mode). In both modes, the salon owners still make all necessary investments to maintain the facilities and advertise the salon to customers, while the stylists must exert effort to provide quality service to customers.

Another large set of relevant industries involves firms that need salespeople, brokers, or distributors to sell their products or services. Examples include the use of salespeople by manufacturers and the use of brokers by insurance companies. Firms in these markets often use a mix of independent agents, who among other things determine the extent of kickbacks they offer to purchase managers, and employees, for whom the firm determines and provides the kickbacks that are given to purchase managers. The commission rates paid out by the firms vary substantially across the two modes (Anderson, 1985).

Similarly, firms providing a wide range of products or services can do so through company-owned outlets or through independent franchisees. Most business format franchisors (e.g. hotels, fast-food outlets, and car rentals) use a combination of upfront fixed franchise fees and sales-based royalties (Blair and Lafontaine, 2005). While franchise contracts are notoriously restrictive, franchisees nevertheless control some key decisions that impact the revenues they generate (e.g. their expenditure on staff). In contrast, these decisions are made by the firm in company-owned outlets.

An example that is relevant for developing countries is sharecropping, in which landowners can decide how much to share their crops and relevant decision rights with agricultural workers. At one extreme, the landowner rents the land to a lessee at a fixed rate and the lessee has full control over inputs. At the other extreme, the landowner employs agricultural laborers at fixed wages and fully

²Note our focus on the allocation of control rights between agents and the principal is consistent with [legal definitions](#) that emphasize control rights as the most important factor determining whether agents should be considered independent contractors or employees. This is reflected in lawsuits surrounding Uber and other platforms in the “sharing economy”.

controls inputs. In between these two extremes, the landowner and the sharecropper share crops³ and decision rights over inputs. Double-sided moral hazard is key in explaining the structure of sharecropping contracts, as noted by Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995).

Table 1 shows how these and other examples fit our theory. In particular, it illustrates the three different types of non-contractible decision variables featured in our model that affect the revenue generated by each agent: (i) transferable decisions that are chosen by the principal in \mathcal{P} -mode and by the agent in \mathcal{A} -mode; (ii) costly ongoing investments always chosen by the agent; and (iii) costly ongoing investments always chosen by the principal.

Table 1: Examples

	<i>Transferable decisions</i>	<i>Non-transferable investment decisions made by agents</i>	<i>Non-transferable investment decisions made by the principal</i>
Hair salons	marketing of individual hair dressers; quality and maintenance of equipment; spending on supplies	quality of service	maintenance and advertising of the salon
Transportation (e.g. Uber vs. traditional taxi companies)	quality of the car (make and model); maintenance of the car; location of work	knowledge of routes in the relevant area; quality of service	quality & maintenance of the technological infrastructure (payment, dispatch system); advertising of the firm
Consulting (e.g. Hourly Nerd vs. McKinsey) and outsourcing (e.g. Upwork vs. Infosys)	marketing of individual professionals and their skills; price	effort to understand customer requests; quality of service	quality & maintenance of the (online) system for communication, monitoring and payment; advertising of the firm
Online education (e.g. Coursera vs. University of Phoenix)	quality of the course design; advertising of individual instructors and courses	course preparation; quality of course delivery	quality & maintenance of the online infrastructure; advertising of the site
Waste and recycling (e.g. Rubicon Global vs. Waste Management)	condition and maintenance of equipment for waste collection and hauling	quality of service	quality & maintenance of the technological infrastructure (payment, scheduling); advertising of the firm
Producers and sales agents	kickbacks to clients	knowledge of product; sales effort	advertising of the product; product support
Franchising	expenditure on staff and their benefits	outlet manager effort	quality of the product; advertising of the brand
Sharecropping	quality of inputs (seeds, fertilizer and pesticides); tools and equipment ; bribes	adoption of high-yield farming practices; effort in working the land	large investments (e.g. maintenance of irrigation system)

Another possible non-contractible transferable decision variable is the price charged to customers. This is the case in which price is subject to considerable uncertainty in the contracting stage, or when the principal cannot observe price and quantity separately (e.g. some consulting service agreements).

³While 50/50 crop sharing is the most common practice, other splits are also used, as documented by Terpstra (1998).

However, in other cases, price may be contractible, and indeed set by the principal in its contract with the agent—that possibility is covered by Proposition 1 below for the case with one agent and discussed in Section 5.1 for the case with multiple agents. Price may also be pinned down by market constraints, in which case it can be treated as a fixed constant in our analysis (e.g. sharecropping).

4 One agent and multiple actions

In this section, we analyze a setting in which there is a principal (e.g. a firm) and a single agent, but potentially many transferable and non-transferable actions.

Denote by $R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q})$ the revenue generated jointly by the principal and the agent if the latter accepts the principal’s contract. This revenue depends on three types of actions, all of which are non-contractible.

We assume that the actions contained in the vectors $\mathbf{q} = (q^1, \dots, q^{M_q})$ and $\mathbf{Q} = (Q^1, \dots, Q^{M_Q})$ are non-transferable. I.e. the agent always chooses $\mathbf{q} \in \mathbb{R}_+^{M_q}$ at cost $c(\mathbf{q}) \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{M_q} c^i(q^i)$ and the principal always chooses $\mathbf{Q} \in \mathbb{R}_+^{M_Q}$ at cost $C(\mathbf{Q}) \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{M_Q} C^i(Q^i)$. This means there is double-sided moral hazard: \mathbf{q} encompasses ongoing effort and investment decisions that are always made by the agent and that raise the customers’ willingness to pay for the service provided (see column 3 in Table 1), while \mathbf{Q} captures the ongoing investments that are always made by the principal (see column 4 in Table 1).⁴ In contrast, the actions contained in the vector $\mathbf{a} = (a^1, \dots, a^{M_a})$ are transferable, i.e. each of them can be chosen *either* by the principal *or* by the agent, depending on how the principal chooses to allocate control rights (see column 2 of Table 1). The party that chooses $a^i \in \mathbb{R}_+$ incurs cost $f^i(a^i)$. We denote $f(\mathbf{a}) \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{M_a} f^i(a^i)$. We assume there is at least one action of each type, i.e. $M_q \geq 1$, $M_Q \geq 1$ and $M_a \geq 1$.

This set-up should be interpreted as a simplified version of a more general model, in which all $M_a + M_q + M_a$ actions are transferable in principle. In such a framework, if the principal has a very large cost disadvantage in choosing \mathbf{q} , then control over these actions will always be given to the agent. Similarly, if the agent has a very large cost disadvantage in choosing \mathbf{Q} , these actions will always be controlled by the principal. The transferable actions \mathbf{a} can then be viewed as actions for which the agent and the principal have comparable (but possibly different) costs. We discuss the possibility of such cost asymmetries in Section 4.2.

The principal chooses the set $D \subset \{1, \dots, M_a\}$ of transferable decisions over which it keeps control (leaving the agent to control decisions $i \in \{1, \dots, M_a\} \setminus D$) and offers a revenue-sharing contract $\Omega(R)$ to the agent, where $\Omega(\cdot)$ can be any arbitrary function of the revenue R generated. The contract means that the agent obtains $\Omega(R)$, while the principal obtains $R - \Omega(R)$.⁵ We assume the principal

⁴This formulation can also encompass investments that can be made by both parties, i.e. such that one party’s investment in a given action does not preclude the other party from investing in the same type of action, each carrying its own cost. For example, both the principal and the agent can invest in training. In this case, we can always define q^i as the agent’s investment in training and Q^i as the principal’s investment in training, with revenue affected by both.

⁵In our model it is immaterial whether the principal or the agent collects revenues R and pays the other party their share according to the contract $\Omega(R)$. For instance, if the principal is a firm that employs the agent, then the payment of $\Omega(R)$ can be interpreted as a combination of fixed wage plus bonus in an employment relationship.

holds all the bargaining power. This implies that it sets $\Omega(\cdot)$ in both modes so that the agent is indifferent between participation and its outside option, which for convenience we normalize to zero throughout. In the analysis that follows, two extreme allocations of decision rights will play a central role: $D = \{1, \dots, M_a\}$, which we call the \mathcal{P} -mode (the principal controls all transferable decisions) and $D = \emptyset$ which we call the \mathcal{A} -mode (the agent controls all transferable decisions).

The key assumption in this specification is that only the realized revenue R is contractible, whereas the underlying actions $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q})$ are not. We later investigate what happens when some of these actions become contractible. Our model can be interpreted as the reduced form of a model with uncertainty, which could be one reason that the various types of actions are non-contractible in practice. With considerable uncertainty regarding the effects of the various actions on revenues, contingent decision rules could be difficult to describe. In that case, one can resort to the results of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to justify our focus on linear contracts, which we will show are optimal in our setting without uncertainty. We note that linear and uniform contracts are prevalent in all of the examples listed in Table 1 (Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1995 provide empirical evidence in the contexts of franchising and sharecropping).

We also assume that the principal cannot commit to “throwing away” revenue in case a target specified ex-ante is not reached (Holmstrom, 1982). Ex-ante commitments to destroy revenue seem unrealistic, as they require enforcement by an external third party, who then becomes itself subject to a moral hazard problem. This is one reason why such commitments are seldom used in practice (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1984).

The game that we study has the following timing. In stage 1, the principal chooses the allocation of control over transferable actions $D \subset \{1, \dots, M_a\}$ and the associated contract $\Omega(\cdot)$; the agent decides whether or not to accept the contract. In stage 2, the principal chooses \mathbf{Q} and all a^i 's such that $i \in D$, while the agent simultaneously chooses \mathbf{q} and all a^i 's such that $i \in \{1, \dots, M_a\} \setminus D$. Finally, in stage 3, revenues $R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q})$ are realized; the principal receives $R - \Omega(R)$ and the agent receives $\Omega(R)$.

Throughout the paper, we use the following three notational conventions. First, for variables and parameters that apply to both the agent and the principal, we use lowercase for the agent and uppercase for the principal (e.g. \mathbf{q} and \mathbf{Q}). Second, vectors are written in bold. Third, subscripts next to functions always indicate derivatives: for example, $f_{a^i}^i$ indicates the derivative of f^i with respect to a^i and R_{a^i} indicates the partial derivative of R with respect to the transferable action a^i .

We make the following technical assumptions:

(a1) All functions are twice continuously differentiable in all arguments.

(a2) For all $i \in \{1, \dots, M_a\}$, $j \in \{1, \dots, M_q\}$ and $k \in \{1, \dots, M_Q\}$, the revenue function $R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q})$ is increasing in a^i , q^j and Q^k , the cost functions f^i , c^j and C^k are increasing and convex, and

$$f^i(0) = f_{a^i}^i(0) = c^j(0) = c_{q^j}^j(0) = C^k(0) = C_{Q^k}^k(0) = 0.$$

(a3) For all $t \in [0, 1]$, $tR(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) - f(\mathbf{a}) - c(\mathbf{q}) - C(\mathbf{Q})$ is concave in $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q})$ and admits a unique finite maximizer in any subset of the $M_a + M_q + M_Q$ variables $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q})$ for any values of the remaining variables.

(a4) For all $\tau \in [0, 1]^{M_a+M_q+M_Q}$, the system of equations

$$\begin{cases} \tau^i R_{a^i}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) = f_{a^i}^i(a^i) & \text{for } i \in \{1, \dots, M_a\} \\ \tau^{M_a+j} R_{q^j}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) = c_{q^j}^j(q^j) & \text{for } j \in \{1, \dots, M_q\} \\ \tau^{M_a+M_q+k} R_{Q^k}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) = C_{Q^k}^k(Q^k) & \text{for } k \in \{1, \dots, M_Q\} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

admits a unique solution $(\mathbf{a}(\tau), \mathbf{q}(\tau), \mathbf{Q}(\tau))$.

These assumptions are standard and ensure that the optimization problems considered below are well-behaved. Assumptions (a3) and (a4) ensure that there is always a unique finite solution to the optimization problems we consider; in particular, they obviate the need for more general stability conditions for uniqueness, that would be quite complex in this setting. Furthermore, the principal always finds it optimal to induce the agent to participate.

While we have assumed the vectors $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q})$ only contain costly actions that increase revenues (e.g. investments in advertising, equipment, technology infrastructure, etc.), our main results remain unchanged when we add any number of costless actions, in which the revenue function R is single-peaked (e.g. price, the choice of a particular design out of several options). We discuss this below.

4.1 Baseline results

We first establish that in our set-up, we can restrict attention to linear contracts without loss of generality (the proof, together with all other proofs, is in the appendix).

Lemma 1 *If assumptions (a1)-(a4) hold, then the principal can achieve the best possible outcome with a linear contract.*

This result is an extension to a multidimensional setting of similar results obtained in Romano (1994) and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) who also allow for double-sided moral hazard. It implies that we can restrict attention to contracts offered by the principal that take the form

$$\Omega(R) = (1-t)R - T,$$

where T can be interpreted as the fixed fee collected by the principal and $t \in [0, 1]$ as the share of revenue kept by the principal. This means the net payoff received by the principal is $tR + T$ and the net payoff received by the agent is $(1-t)R - T$. In general, the optimal contract will have different (t, T) depending on the allocation of control over transferable actions D . Thus, it is possible for T to be negative under some allocations (i.e. the agent receives a fixed wage) and positive under other allocations (i.e. the agent pays a fixed fee).

Lemma 1 implies that, given an allocation of decision rights $D \subset \{1, \dots, M_a\}$ chosen by the principal, its profits can be written as⁶

$$\Pi^*(D) = \max_{t, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}} \{R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) - f(\mathbf{a}) - c(\mathbf{q}) - C(\mathbf{Q})\} \quad (2)$$

s.t.

$$\begin{cases} tR_{a^i}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) = f_{a^i}^i(a^i) & \text{for } i \in D \\ (1-t)R_{a^i}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) = f_{a^i}^i(a^i) & \text{for } i \in \{1, \dots, M_a\} \setminus D \\ (1-t)R_{q^j}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) = c_{q^j}^j(q^j) & \text{for } j \in \{1, \dots, M_q\} \\ tR_{Q^k}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) = C_{Q^k}^k(Q^k) & \text{for } k \in \{1, \dots, M_Q\}. \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

In general, for any D , the principal's profits are lower than the first-best profit level

$$\max_{\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}} \{R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) - f(\mathbf{a}) - c(\mathbf{q}) - C(\mathbf{Q})\}.$$

This reflects that revenue $R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q})$ needs to be divided between the principal and the agent to incentivize each of them to choose their respective actions. This inefficiency is the moral hazard in teams identified by Holmstrom (1982), where a team here consists of the agent and the principal.⁷

Inspection of (2)-(3) makes it clear that different allocations of control rights over transferable actions lead to different profits. Clearly, in order for the choice of D to be non-trivial, there must be at least one non-transferable action of each type (\mathbf{q} and \mathbf{Q}). Otherwise, the principal would be able to attain the first-best outcome either with $D^* = \{1, \dots, M_a\}$ and $t = 1$ (in case $M_q = 0$) or with $D^* = \emptyset$ and $t = 0$ (in case $M_Q = 0$).

For future reference, denote by $t^{\mathcal{P}^*}$ and $t^{\mathcal{A}^*}$ the respective optimal variable fees charged by the principal in \mathcal{P} -mode and \mathcal{A} -mode, i.e. the respective solutions in t that emerge from (2)-(3) when $D = \{1, \dots, M_a\}$ and $D = \emptyset$. Also let

$$\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} \equiv \Pi^*(\{1, \dots, M_a\}) \text{ and } \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*} \equiv \Pi^*(\emptyset).$$

The analysis in the rest of this section will rely on the following additional assumption:

(a5) For $\boldsymbol{\tau} \in [0, 1]^{M_a + M_q + M_Q}$, if $\Pi(\boldsymbol{\tau}) \equiv R(\mathbf{a}(\boldsymbol{\tau}), \mathbf{q}(\boldsymbol{\tau}), \mathbf{Q}(\boldsymbol{\tau})) - f(\mathbf{a}(\boldsymbol{\tau})) - c(\mathbf{q}(\boldsymbol{\tau})) - C(\mathbf{Q}(\boldsymbol{\tau}))$, where $(\mathbf{a}(\boldsymbol{\tau}), \mathbf{q}(\boldsymbol{\tau}), \mathbf{Q}(\boldsymbol{\tau}))$ is the unique solution to the system of equations (1), then $\Pi(\boldsymbol{\tau})$ is increasing in each τ^i for $i \in \{1, \dots, M_a + M_q + M_Q\}$.

In words, this assumption requires that reducing the distortion in any second stage decision problem for any action (by increasing τ^i) increases the principal's overall net profit. In an [online appendix](#), we

⁶At the optimum, the fixed fee T of the linear contract is always set such that the participation constraint of the agent is binding, i.e.

$$(1-t)R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) - \sum_{i \in \{1, \dots, M_a\} \setminus D} f^i(a^i) - c(\mathbf{q}) - T = 0.$$

⁷The only way first-best would be attained in our framework is if all investments were transferable and one party (principal or agent) had no cost disadvantage in choosing any investment. That party should then be given control over all investments and 100% of revenue.

prove that a sufficient condition for (a5) to hold is that $R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q})$ is weakly supermodular in all of its arguments.⁸ However, weak supermodularity is not necessary: (a5) can still hold even when the various non-contractible actions are strategic substitutes in the revenue function. What is required in this case is that the interaction effects are not too negative, so that they do not overwhelm the direct positive effect on net profits of increasing the incentive to invest in any given non-contractible action by raising the corresponding τ^i . Seen in this light, (a5) is a rather mild assumption.

We can now derive the main results in this section.

Proposition 1 *If assumptions (a1)-(a5) hold, then:*

1. *The optimal allocation of control rights over transferable actions is either $D^* = \emptyset$ (\mathcal{A} -mode) or $D^* = \{1, \dots, M_a\}$ (\mathcal{P} -mode).*
2. *$\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} > \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}$ (the \mathcal{P} -mode is optimal) implies $t^{\mathcal{P}^*} > 1/2$ and $\Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*} > \Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*}$ (the \mathcal{A} -mode is optimal) implies $t^{\mathcal{A}^*} < 1/2$. Furthermore, $\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} = \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}$ implies $t^{\mathcal{A}^*} \leq 1/2 \leq t^{\mathcal{P}^*}$.*

The first result in Proposition 1 says that, provided (a1)-(a5) hold, the principal maximizes its profits by choosing either the \mathcal{P} -mode or the \mathcal{A} -mode. The second result in Proposition 1 then says that the principal would never find it optimal to function in \mathcal{P} -mode and keep less than 50% of revenue or function in \mathcal{A} -mode and keep more than 50% of revenue.

The mechanism underlying the results in the proposition is straightforward: giving control rights over all transferable actions to the party that obtains a higher share of revenues (i.e. aligning low-powered and high-powered incentives) reduces revenue-sharing distortions and thereby raises the principal's profit. To see this, denote by $t^*(D^*)$ the optimal variable fee associated with one of the optimal allocations of control rights D^* . If $t^*(D^*) < 1/2$ and $D^* \neq \emptyset$, then the distortions can be reduced by shifting control over all transferable actions in D^* from the principal to the agent. Indeed, this changes the first-order condition determining action a^i in the second stage from

$$t^*(D^*) R_{a^i}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) = f_{a^i}^i(a^i)$$

to

$$(1 - t^*(D^*)) R_{a^i}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) = f_{a^i}^i(a^i)$$

for all $i \in D^*$. The first-order conditions in \mathbf{q} and \mathbf{Q} stay unchanged. Given (a5) and $1 - t^*(D^*) > 1/2 > t^*(D^*)$, this change leads to an outcome that is closer to the first-best and therefore higher equilibrium profits for the principal. If $t^*(D^*) > 1/2$ and $D^* \neq \{1, \dots, M_a\}$, then, by the same logic, profits can be increased by shifting control over all transferable actions not already in D^* to the principal. Only in the special case when $t^*(D^*) = 1/2$ would any split of control rights, including a strictly interior split, be optimal.

⁸The online appendix is available at <https://sites.google.com/site/wrighteconomics/home/research>.

We should emphasize that these results are not driven by positive interaction effects between the various non-contractible actions in revenue (recall that supermodularity is not necessary), nor by any cost economies of scope across transferable actions. Indeed, we have assumed the costs of the transferable actions are independent of one another. If there were economies of scope among them, that would provide an additional reason for giving the same party control (and therefore cost responsibility) for all of these actions.

Nor do these results reflect a knife-edge scenario due to the assumption of equal costs between the principal and the agent of choosing the transferable actions. In Section 4.2, we provide a more general version of the first result in Proposition 1, allowing for cost asymmetries in choosing the transferable actions. We also show that the second result in Proposition 1 is surprisingly robust to the introduction of such cost asymmetries in a linear example.

The second result in Proposition 1 can be re-stated in a more empirically useful way. Define

$$t^* \equiv \begin{cases} t^{\mathcal{P}^*} & \text{if } \Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} \geq \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*} \\ t^{\mathcal{A}^*} & \text{if } \Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} < \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}, \end{cases}$$

which is the optimal variable fee charged by the principal in the optimal mode. The following corollary is a logical reformulation of the second result in Proposition 1.

Corollary 1 *If assumptions (a1)-(a5) hold, then $t^* < 1/2$ if and only if the \mathcal{A} -mode is strictly optimal (i.e. $\Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*} > \Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*}$) and $t^* \geq 1/2$ if and only if the \mathcal{P} -mode is weakly optimal (i.e. $\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} \geq \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}$).*

Thus, the agent obtains more than 50% of attributable revenues if and only if the principal has chosen (optimally) the \mathcal{A} -mode. This provides an empirically testable implication: other things being equal, we expect that organizations that have chosen the \mathcal{A} -mode should leave a larger share of their revenues to agents than organizations that have chosen the \mathcal{P} -mode.⁹ For example, hair salons that rent out chairs charge only a fixed rental fee, letting stylists keep 100% of sales, whereas traditional hair salons that employ their hairstylists offer bonuses ranging from 35% to 60% of sales.¹⁰

Finally, we could add any number of costless transferable actions (e.g. price, horizontal design decisions) and allocate control over each of them to the principal or the agent, without any impact on the predictions of Proposition 1 regarding costly actions. To see this, note that the first-order condition corresponding to any costless action a^i in (2)-(3) would be $R_{a^i}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) = 0$, regardless of whether a^i is chosen by the principal or the agent. The only way in which the allocation of control over a costless action can have an impact on the tradeoff between \mathcal{P} -mode and \mathcal{A} -mode is in a setting with multiple agents and spillovers from the actions of one agent on other agents—we study this scenario in Section 5.2. Similarly, Proposition 1 would remain unchanged if we added an arbitrary number of

⁹In the case of sales agents for products, the percentage commissions for independent agents are higher than those for employees, but both are much lower than 50% (usually less than 10%) of revenues from product sales. This reflects the fact that revenue also includes production costs, which in many cases is not easily observed by the agent. For these cases, the revenue R in our model is best interpreted as revenue net of production costs.

¹⁰See “Hair & Nail Salons in the US,” IBIS World Industry Report 81211, February 2015.

contractible decisions (e.g. price) that impact the revenue function and that the principal could set at the same time it chooses the optimal control allocation and contract for the agent.

4.2 Cost asymmetries and endogenous transferability

Proposition 1 assumes away differences between the principal and the agent in the costs of undertaking the transferable actions or in their impact on revenues. In some real-world examples, such differences are an important factor in determining which control rights are held by the principal and which are held by agents. For example, the principal may have economies-of-scale advantages over individual agents when incurring the cost associated with some transferable actions (e.g. volume discounts in purchasing equipment) or better information regarding the impact of those transferable actions on revenues due to access to more data (e.g. Uber and Lyft when setting prices for rides). In other contexts, the cost or information advantages lie with the agent (e.g. sharecroppers may have better knowledge than the landowners for determining expenditure on seeds, fertilizer and pesticides; the same may be true for franchisees when choosing staff benefits).

Introducing cost asymmetries is straightforward in our model and provides an easy way of explaining why in practice some control rights are held by the principal and others are held by agents. Specifically, we can simply assume that the cost of the transferable action a^i is $F^i(a^i)$ when incurred by the principal and $f^i(a^i)$ when incurred by the agent, where the functions F^i have the same properties as previously assumed for the functions f^i , with $i \in \{1, \dots, M_a\}$. In this formulation, actions a^i such that $F^i(a^i) < f^i(a^i)$ are more likely to be allocated to the principal and actions a^i such that $F^i(a^i) > f^i(a^i)$ are more likely to be allocated to the agent.

Cost asymmetries also provide a natural interpretation of what we mean by non-transferable actions. The actions \mathbf{q} are those that the principal has such a large cost disadvantage in carrying out that it is never profitable to allow him to do so. And similarly for actions \mathbf{Q} when they are carried out by the agent. Then \mathbf{a} should be thought of encompassing actions where such cost differences are not too large.


Even with cost differences, the tendency to allocate decision rights based on relative cost advantage must still be weighed against the revenue-sharing disadvantage of splitting decision rights over costly actions—the mechanism behind the first result in Proposition 1. Indeed, it is straightforward to show that Proposition 1 is robust to cost differences that are not too large.¹¹

Proposition 2 *Suppose $F^i(a^i) = \theta^i f^i(a^i)$ and assumptions (a1)-(a5) hold. Then if θ^i is sufficiently close to 1 for all $i \in \{1, \dots, M_a\}$, it is optimal to give control over all M_a transferable actions to the same party. I.e. there exist $(\varepsilon^1, \dots, \varepsilon^{M_a}) \in (0, 1)^{M_a}$ such that one of the pure modes (\mathcal{P} -mode or \mathcal{A} -mode) is optimal whenever $|\theta^i - 1| \leq \varepsilon^i$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, M_a\}$.*

This result says that strictly interior splits of control rights over costly transferable actions should only occur when there are significant cost differences between principal and agent in undertaking those

¹¹The proof follows from noting that the result holds for $(\theta^1, \dots, \theta^{M_a}) = (1, \dots, 1)$ (the first result in Proposition 1) and continuity in $(\theta^1, \dots, \theta^{M_a})$.

Figure 1: Optimal choice of mode with cost differences



actions. Nevertheless, even when the cost differences are significant, the revenue-sharing disadvantage of splitting decision rights can still lead to all transferable actions being chosen by the same party. To illustrate this point, consider the following example with $M_a = 2$, $M_q = M_Q = 1$, a linear revenue function, and quadratic costs:

$$R(a_1, a_2, q, Q) = a_1 + a_2 + \phi q + \Phi Q \quad (4)$$

$$f^1(a_1) = \frac{\theta_1 a_1^2}{2}, f^2(a_2) = \frac{\theta_2 a_2^2}{2}, F^1(a_1) = \frac{a_1^2}{2}, F^2(a_2) = \frac{a_2^2}{2}, c(q) = \frac{\phi q^2}{2} \text{ and } C(Q) = \frac{\Phi Q^2}{2}. \quad (5)$$

The parameters ϕ and Φ represent the weights placed on the profit generated by the agent's and principal's non-transferable investments, respectively. The parameters θ_1 and θ_2 represent the cost advantages of the agent relative to the principal in choosing actions a_1 and a_2 , respectively.

Suppose $\phi = \Phi = 1$. Then, when $\theta_1 < 1$ and $\theta_2 < 1$, the \mathcal{A} -mode is optimal. Alternatively, when $\theta_1 > 1$ and $\theta_2 > 1$, the \mathcal{P} -mode is optimal. The interesting cases arise when either $\theta_1 < 1 < \theta_2$ or $\theta_2 < 1 < \theta_1$, i.e. where one party is more efficient at choosing a_1 and the other party is more efficient at choosing a_2 . In these cases, based on cost advantage alone, one might expect that it should always be optimal for one party to control a_1 and the other party to control a_2 —which we refer to as the hybrid mode. Figure 1 shows the regions in the space $(\theta_1, \theta_2) \in [0, 2] \times [0, 2]$ where each mode dominates: light gray for \mathcal{A} -mode, dark gray for the hybrid mode and black for \mathcal{P} -mode.

As can be seen from Figure 1, the hybrid mode only dominates for a relatively small part of the

upper left and bottom right quadrants ($\theta_1 < 1 < \theta_2$ and $\theta_2 < 1 < \theta_1$). Thus, Figure 1 illustrates that strictly interior splits of control rights over costly transferable actions should be more rarely observed in practice than implied by the logic of cost (or information) advantage alone. On the other hand, as pointed out above, costless transferable actions can be allocated based on relative information advantage, so there is no reason (based on our model) to expect that they will be allocated to the same party that controls the costly actions.

Cost differences also imply that the second part of Proposition 1 or Corollary 1 no longer hold for all parameter values. Nevertheless, provided cost differences are not too large, these results should still apply. To illustrate this, we use the example defined in (4)-(5) and consider the parameter space $(\phi, \Phi, \theta_1, \theta_2) \in [0, 2]^4$. We find that the \mathcal{P} -mode never dominates when agents receive more than 50% of variable revenues (i.e. $t^* < 0.5$), and the \mathcal{A} -mode never dominates when agents receive less than 50% of variable revenues (i.e. $t^* > 0.5$), i.e. the second part of Proposition 1 continues to hold. Thus, under these assumptions, a regulator that has to classify workers as either employees (\mathcal{P} -mode) or independent contractors (\mathcal{A} -mode) and does so on the basis of the observed t^* being smaller or larger than 50%, would never get the classification wrong, even with moderate cost asymmetries.¹²

4.3 Effects of contractibility and moral hazard

Equipped with the baseline results from Proposition 1, we now examine the impact on the optimal choice of mode of two key factors: (i) the contractibility of the agent's and principal's non-transferable investments, and (ii) the importance of the agent's and principal's moral hazard. To do so, we revert to the assumptions that the principal and the agent have the same costs of choosing transferable actions, so that the only possible optimal allocations are \mathcal{A} -mode or \mathcal{P} -mode.

We start by precisely defining the meaning of shifting the tradeoff in favor of one mode or the other.

Definition *We say that a change in parameters shifts the tradeoff in favor of the \mathcal{A} -mode (respectively, the \mathcal{P} -mode) if the change does not decrease $\Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*} - \Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*}$ (respectively, $\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} - \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}$) for any initial parameter values and increases $\Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*} - \Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*}$ (respectively, $\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} - \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}$) for some initial parameter values.*

4.3.1 Contractibility of non-transferable investments

First, we wish to know what happens to the tradeoff between \mathcal{A} -mode and \mathcal{P} -mode when one of the non-transferable investments—the principal's or the agent's—becomes contractible. For conciseness, we investigate whether making q^1 contractible shifts the tradeoff in favor of one of the modes (the effect of making Q^1 contractible is then obtained by symmetry).

Standard intuition based on the traditional theory of the firm literature suggests that if one party's actions become more contractible, then ownership of productive assets—and with it, residual control

¹²Note that classifying workers as employees or independent contractors when the hybrid mode is optimal cannot be considered a mistake given that the regulator is required to classify workers in one of the pure modes.

rights—should shift to the other party. Wernerfelt (2002) proves a formal version of this idea, while Baker and Hubbard (2004) provide empirical evidence in the context of trucking. Specifically, the advent of on-board computers and GPS technology made it possible for trucking companies to condition contracts on their drivers’ driving behavior. Baker and Hubbard show that this change in technology led to a significant shift among trucking companies from hiring truck drivers as independent contractors (\mathcal{A} -mode) to hiring them as employees (\mathcal{P} -mode).

The corresponding intuition in our model runs as follows. In the optimal \mathcal{A} -mode contract, the agent keeps a larger share of revenue than in the optimal \mathcal{P} -mode contract, which means the \mathcal{A} -mode is better at generating profit from the agent’s non-transferable investments. If q^1 becomes contractible, then that reduces the agent’s moral hazard and therefore the importance of generating profit from the agent’s non-transferable investments. As a result, giving the agent low-powered incentives (i.e. control over the a^i ’s) becomes relatively less attractive: in other words, the \mathcal{P} -mode should become relatively more attractive. This intuition is correct when the revenue function is additively separable in all of its arguments.

Proposition 3 *Suppose assumptions (a1)-(a5) hold. If the revenue function $R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q})$ is additively separable in all of its arguments, then making q^1 contractible (respectively, making Q^1 contractible) shifts the tradeoff in favor of the \mathcal{P} -mode (respectively, in favor of the \mathcal{A} -mode).*

Proposition 3 provides one explanation for the finding in Baker and Hubbard (2004). It also suggests that the development of Internet and mobile technologies need not increase the prevalence of platforms at the expense of more traditional employment modes.

However, the intuition for Proposition 3 is incomplete when there are positive interaction effects in the revenue function between the multiple non-transferable investments q^i chosen by the agent, i.e. $M_q \geq 2$ and R is supermodular in \mathbf{q} . In that case, making q^1 contractible has another effect that goes in the opposite direction. Indeed, q^1 can now be set to a higher value, which by supermodularity implies the other q^i ’s will be increased as well. If $t^{\mathcal{A}^*} < t^{\mathcal{P}^*}$ (which holds as long as the interaction effects across \mathbf{a} , \mathbf{q} and \mathbf{Q} are not too strong), then the gain from being able to increase q^i is larger in \mathcal{A} -mode than in \mathcal{P} -mode. This means that rendering q^1 contractible makes the \mathcal{A} -mode relatively more attractive. The balance of the two effects can go either way, and it is straightforward to come up with functional forms, for which the prediction in Proposition 3 no longer holds.

Example *Suppose revenue and costs are*

$$\begin{aligned} R(a, q_1, q_2, Q) &= 1.2a + 0.4q_1 + 0.8q_2 + 1.6q_1q_2 + 2Q \\ f(a) &= a^2, c^1(q_1) = q_1^2, c^2(q_2) = q_2^2 \text{ and } C(Q) = Q^2. \end{aligned}$$

With these functional forms, it is easily verified that $\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^} - \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*} > 0$ (\mathcal{P} -mode is preferred) when q_1 is non-contractible and $\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} - \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*} < 0$ (\mathcal{A} -mode is preferred) after q_1 becomes contractible.*

In summary, the principal faces the following tradeoff. On the one hand, after one of the agent’s non-transferable investments becomes contractible, there are fewer sources of moral hazard for the

agent. On the other hand, being able to contract on that investment can raise the marginal gains from increasing the agent's remaining non-transferable and non-contractible investments if there are positive interaction effects (note that multi-dimensionality of the agent's non-transferable investments is crucial for this effect). The net effect determines whether the benefit from giving the agent low-powered incentives increases or decreases.

4.3.2 Importance of moral hazard

Next, consider what happens to the tradeoff between the \mathcal{P} -mode and the \mathcal{A} -mode when the agent's (respectively, the principal's) moral hazard becomes more important. To make this meaningful in our model, we further assume the revenue function is additively separable in the three types of non-contractible actions \mathbf{a} , \mathbf{q} and \mathbf{Q} , i.e.

$$R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) = R^a(\mathbf{a}) + \phi R^q(\mathbf{q}) + \Phi R^Q(\mathbf{Q}), \quad (6)$$

where $(\phi, \Phi) \in \mathbb{R}_+^2$ are two parameters.¹³ Let also

$$c(\mathbf{q}) \equiv \sum_{j=1}^{M_q} \phi c^j(q^j) \quad \text{and} \quad C(\mathbf{Q}) \equiv \sum_{k=1}^{M_Q} \Phi C^k(Q^k).$$

Thus, ϕ is the weight placed on the profit generated by the agent's non-transferable investments $\pi^q(\mathbf{q}) \equiv R^q(\mathbf{q}) - \sum_{i=1}^{M_q} c^i(q^i)$, and can be interpreted as measuring the importance of the agent's moral hazard. Similarly, Φ is the weight placed on the profit generated by the principal's non-transferable investments $\pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}) \equiv R^Q(\mathbf{Q}) - \sum_{i=1}^{M_Q} C^i(Q^i)$, and can be interpreted as measuring the importance of the principal's moral hazard.

With these definitions, we obtain the following result.

Proposition 4 *Suppose assumptions (a1)-(a5) hold and the revenue function takes the additively separable form in \mathbf{a} , \mathbf{q} and \mathbf{Q} given by (6). If the weight placed on the profit generated by the agent's (respectively, the principal's) non-transferable investments increases, the tradeoff is shifted in favor of the \mathcal{A} -mode (respectively, \mathcal{P} -mode).*

The intuition for Proposition 4 is the same as that for Proposition 3. The \mathcal{A} -mode is better at generating profit from the agent's non-transferable investments, so increasing the weight placed on the profit generated by the agent's non-transferable investments in the principal's overall profit results in a shift towards the \mathcal{A} -mode. More formally, because ϕ multiplies both the revenue and the cost associated with the agent's non-transferable investments, it does not change the second-stage equilibrium levels of actions $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q})$ for any given t in either mode. Moreover, due to the envelope theorem, the effects of a change in ϕ through changes in $t^{\mathcal{P}*}$ and $t^{\mathcal{A}*}$ are second-order. As a result,

¹³If there were interaction effects across the various types of actions in the revenue function, it would be difficult to provide a clear notion of the importance of the agent's (respectively, the principal's) moral hazard.

the only first-order effect of ϕ on the profit differential between the \mathcal{A} -mode and the \mathcal{P} -mode is the direct effect $\pi^q(\mathbf{q}^{A*}) - \pi^q(\mathbf{q}^{P*})$. Additive separability of R in \mathbf{a} , \mathbf{q} and \mathbf{Q} implies $t^{A*} < t^{P*}$. Along with (a5), this implies that the profit generated by the agent's non-transferable investment is larger in \mathcal{A} -mode, i.e. $\pi^q(\mathbf{q}^{A*}) > \pi^q(\mathbf{q}^{P*})$, reflecting there is less distortion of \mathbf{q} in \mathcal{A} -mode. Thus, if the agent's moral hazard becomes more important, i.e. ϕ increases, then the profitability of \mathcal{A} -mode improves vis-à-vis \mathcal{P} -mode. The logic for an increase in Φ is symmetric.

However, if instead of increasing the weight on the *profit* generated by the agent's non-transferable investments, we only increased the weight on the *revenue* generated by the agent's non-transferable investments (i.e. costs remain $c(\mathbf{q}) = \sum_{j=1}^{M_q} c^j(q^j)$ regardless of ϕ), then the effect on the tradeoff between \mathcal{A} -mode and \mathcal{P} -mode would in general be ambiguous.¹⁴ Indeed, in this case there are two first-order effects of increasing ϕ : (i) the same direct effect as above (a larger ϕ increases the relative profitability of \mathcal{A} -mode because the revenue generated from the agent's investments \mathbf{q} is higher in \mathcal{A} -mode), (ii) an indirect effect which operates through a change of the optimal \mathbf{q} in both modes.

To evaluate the indirect effect, note that the vector of the agent's non-transferable investments chosen in the second stage is equal to $\mathbf{q}(t\phi)$, where

$$\mathbf{q}(z) \equiv \arg \max_{\mathbf{q}} \{zR^q(\mathbf{q}) - c(\mathbf{q})\}. \quad (7)$$

Due to (a1)-(a4), $\mathbf{q}(z)$ is increasing, so an increase in ϕ now leads to a first-order increase in \mathbf{q} in both modes, even when t is held constant. We still have $t^{A*} < t^{P*}$ and therefore $\mathbf{q}^{A*} > \mathbf{q}^{P*}$, but an increase in ϕ may lead to a larger or smaller increase in \mathbf{q}^{A*} relative to \mathbf{q}^{P*} , so the indirect effect may be positive or negative. Nevertheless, we can provide a sufficient condition for the first (positive) effect to dominate. By symmetry, define

$$\mathbf{Q}(Z) \equiv \arg \max_{\mathbf{Q}} \{ZR^Q(\mathbf{Q}) - C(\mathbf{Q})\}. \quad (8)$$

We then obtain the following result.

Proposition 5 *Suppose assumptions (a1)-(a5) hold and the revenue function takes the additively separable form in \mathbf{a} , \mathbf{q} and \mathbf{Q} given by (6). If the function $q(z)$ defined in (7) is such that $zq_z^j(z)$ is increasing in z for all $j \in \{1, \dots, M_q\}$ (respectively, the function $Q(Z)$ defined in (8) is such that $ZQ_Z^k(Z)$ is increasing in Z for all $k \in \{1, \dots, M_Q\}$), then an increase in the weight placed on the revenue generated by the agent's (respectively, the principal's) non-transferable investments, shifts the tradeoff in favor of the \mathcal{A} -mode (respectively, \mathcal{P} -mode).*

This proposition emphasizes that the standard intuition—decision rights should be given to the party whose moral hazard is more “important”—only holds under special conditions in case the importance of moral hazard refers to the effect on revenue rather than the effect on profit. It is easily

¹⁴If, alternatively, we only increased the weight on the agent's cost of non-transferable investments, we would obtain the reverse of the effects described in this paragraph.

verified that the sufficient condition provided on $\mathbf{q}(z)$ holds when R^q is linear in all of its arguments and c^i is quadratic in q^i for all $i \in \{1, \dots, M_q\}$, which is the functional form adopted in Section 5.1.

5 Multiple agents and spillovers

In the previous section, the need to share revenues created the distortions that drove our results and tradeoffs. In this section we extend our model to $N > 1$ agents and allow for a second source of distortions: spillovers from the level of transferable actions chosen by one agent on the revenues generated by other agents.

In order to analyze the interplay between revenue-sharing and spillovers in the simplest possible way, we assume there is only one non-contractible action of each type, i.e. $M_a = M_q = M_Q = 1$. We denote by a_i the level of the transferable action chosen for agent i and by q_i the level of the non-transferable investment chosen by agent i for $i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$. The revenue function generated jointly by the principal and agent $i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$ is then $R(a_i, \sigma_i, q_i, Q)$, where $\sigma_i \equiv \sigma(a_1, \dots, a_{i-1}, a_{i+1}, \dots, a_N)$ allows for a spillover from the levels of the transferable actions chosen by the other agents on the revenue generated by agent i . We assume σ is a symmetric function of $N - 1$ arguments with values in \mathbb{R}_+ and increasing in all of its arguments. In the examples in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, σ_i will be the average of the other agents' transferable actions, i.e. $\sigma_i = \left(\sum_{j \neq i} a_j\right) / (N - 1)$.

The sign of the spillover is determined by the sign of the derivative of R with respect to its second argument (i.e. R_σ) and can be positive or negative. Consider the following examples from Table 1:

- Hair salons, consulting and outsourcing: spillovers from the marketing of individual professionals are likely negative. A larger investment in the marketing of a given individual professional typically leads to business-stealing from the other professionals.
- Transportation (Uber vs. traditional taxi): spillovers from investments in car quality are likely positive. Better car quality for each individual driver improves the brand image of the entire service in the eyes of customers and therefore helps all other drivers. Business stealing is limited since users rarely, if ever, have the opportunity to choose drivers based on their cars.
- Franchising: spillovers from investments in staff are likely positive. If a given franchisee's staff are more motivated, they provide a better quality of service to customers—this improves the brand image of the franchisor, which in turn helps all other franchisees. Moreover, business stealing among franchisees is limited, since franchisees usually have a certain degree of territorial exclusivity and consumers choose franchisees based on their location at the point of consumption.

Note that $R^i \equiv R(a_i, \sigma_i, q_i, Q)$ does not depend on the level of non-transferable actions q_j chosen by other agents $j \neq i$. As we discuss below, introducing this possibility would not add anything meaningful to the tradeoff between the two modes that we focus on.

The principal can choose to control all transferable actions a_i , $i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$ (i.e. operate in \mathcal{P} -mode) or allow each a_i to be chosen by agent i (i.e. operate in \mathcal{A} -mode).¹⁵ In each mode, the principal

¹⁵In the [online appendix](#) we explore the hybrid possibility that some but not all agents control their a_i .

offers a revenue-sharing contract $\Omega(R^i)$ to each agent i , where, as in Section 4 above, $\Omega(\cdot)$ can be any arbitrary function of the revenue R^i generated by agent i and the revenue-sharing contract means that agent i obtains $\Omega(R^i)$, while the principal obtains $R^i - \Omega(R^i)$.

There are two additional assumptions implicit in this extension of our model to N agents. First, in each mode, the principal offers the same contract to all agents—thus, we rule out price discrimination across agents, which are symmetric in our model. Second, the principal cannot offer an agent a contract contingent on the revenues generated by other agents.

These assumptions are reasonable in the contexts we have in mind. In the examples in Section 3, the principal offers equal terms to all agents and does not normally make payments to an agent conditional on the performance of the other agents (team payments). One reason for the absence of team payments is that agents cannot monitor the revenues generated by other agents—this is especially relevant for the \mathcal{A} -mode, in which agents are independent contractors. Furthermore, using team payments in \mathcal{A} -mode may raise antitrust concerns given that it could be perceived as a type of agreement between competitors (i.e. rival independent contractors). In \mathcal{P} -mode, the principal chooses the a_i 's, so has no need for team payments to internalize the spillovers across them. Instead, the principal could try to use team payments to overcome the double-sided moral hazard problem by using each agent as a budget breaker for her contract with other agents. However, in \mathcal{P} -mode agents are employees within the same organization and should be able to undo any such attempt by cooperating.¹⁶

In the [online appendix](#) we also show that, after adjusting assumptions (a1)-(a4) accordingly, Lemma 1 continues to apply here, so the principal can achieve the best possible outcome with a linear contract in both modes.

In the presence of spillovers, we can no longer derive results similar to the ones in the second part of Proposition 1, even when the revenue function $R(a_i, \sigma_i, q_i, Q)$ is weakly supermodular in all of its arguments.¹⁷ The only exception is the case when spillovers are everywhere positive (i.e. $R_\sigma(a, \sigma, q, Q) > 0$ for all (a, σ, q, Q)) and $\Pi^{A^*} > \Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*}$. In this case, we can conclude that $t^{A^*} < 1/2$. The logic is similar to that in Proposition 1. Suppose $t^{A^*} \geq 1/2$. Then the distortions in the choices of non-contractible actions could be reduced by shifting control over the transferable actions from the agents to the principal. Indeed, this changes the first-order condition determining the equilibrium a in the second stage from

$$(1 - t^{A^*}) R_a(a, \sigma(a, \dots, a), q, Q) = f_a(a)$$

to

$$t^{A^*} \left(R_a(a, \sigma(a, \dots, a), q, Q) + \frac{d(\sigma(a, \dots, a))}{da} R_\sigma(a, s(a), q, Q) \right) = f_a(a).$$

The other two first-order conditions stay unchanged. Since $t^{A^*} \geq 1 - t^{A^*}$, $\sigma(\cdot)$ is increasing in all of its $N - 1$ arguments, $R_\sigma > 0$ and (a, σ, q, Q) are weak strategic complements in the revenue function, this change would result in second-stage equilibrium levels of (a, q, Q) that are closer to the first-best levels. Therefore equilibrium profits would be at least as high in \mathcal{P} -mode, which is a contradiction.

¹⁶In the [online appendix](#) we prove that such cooperation renders team payments irrelevant.

¹⁷Recall that this implies assumption (a5) holds.

However, this argument breaks down if spillovers are not everywhere positive, because then the second-stage equilibrium levels of (a, q, Q) may be lower. Furthermore, regardless of the sign of spillovers, $\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} > \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}$ does not necessarily imply $t^{\mathcal{P}^*} > 1/2$. If $t^{\mathcal{P}^*} \leq 1/2$, then shifting control over the transferable actions from the principal to the agents reduces the revenue-sharing distortion ($1 - t^{\mathcal{P}^*} \geq t^{\mathcal{P}^*}$), but creates the distortion due to spillovers being left uninternalized by the agents, so it is unclear which of these two effects dominates.¹⁸

The interaction between revenue sharing and spillovers creates the possibility of interesting new results. The revenue-sharing distortion implies that we are in a second-best world in both modes. In this context, positive spillovers lead to the a_i 's being set too low in \mathcal{A} -mode, which exacerbates the revenue-sharing distortion. On the other hand, negative spillovers lead to the a_i 's being set too high in \mathcal{A} -mode, which can offset the distortion due to revenue-sharing. As we discuss in greater detail in the following two subsections, this possibility has counterintuitive implications for the tradeoff between the two modes. For example, unlike the case with positive spillovers, an increase in the magnitude of negative spillovers can shift the tradeoff in favor of the \mathcal{A} -mode.

The two simplest scenarios in which these results appear are:

1. Costly transferable action and an additively separable revenue function.
2. Costless transferable action (namely, price) and a non-additively separable revenue function.

The two cases exhibit different mechanisms—we analyze them in the next sections through specific examples. These two cases correspond to realistic scenarios. In some contexts, prices are either pinned down by market constraints, or easily observable and contracted upon, which means that they do not have an impact on the \mathcal{P} -mode versus \mathcal{A} -mode choice. This is the first case, in which spillovers arise instead from the costly transferable action.

Alternatively, the optimal price may be subject to considerable uncertainty in the contracting stage or may be unobservable separately from quantity by the principal—in such contexts, the principal may only offer contracts based on revenue. Price then becomes a relevant transferable and non-contractible variable, and spillovers arise from the price level specific to each agent. It is worth emphasizing that the interaction between spillovers and revenue-sharing makes the tradeoff between the two modes meaningful even when the (sole) transferable action is costless—by contrast, recall that costless actions had no impact on the tradeoff in the model with one agent from Section 4.

5.1 Linear example

In this section we assume that the revenue generated by agent i is

$$R(a_i, \bar{a}_{-i}, q_i, Q) = \beta a_i + x(\bar{a}_{-i} - a_i) + \phi q_i + \Phi Q, \quad (9)$$

¹⁸Nevertheless, it can be shown using the linear-quadratic specification (9)-(11) in Section 5.1, that provided spillovers are not too strong, Corollary 1 still applies. Specifically, normalizing $\beta = 1$, restricting $(\phi, \Phi) \in [0, 2] \times [0, 2]$ and x such that the cross-effect generated by a is no more than one-third as strong as the direct effect of a , we find numerically that Corollary 1 still holds. We also find that Corollary 1 continues to hold for a much wider range of parameter values provided the observed share of revenues is not too close to the 50% cutoff level (i.e. provided t^* is not too close to 0.5).

where \bar{a}_{-i} is the average of the transferable actions chosen for $j \neq i$, i.e.

$$\bar{a}_{-i} \equiv \frac{\sum_{j \neq i} a_j}{N-1}. \quad (10)$$

Costs are assumed to be quadratic:

$$f(a) = \frac{\beta}{2}a^2, \quad c(q) = \frac{\phi}{2}q^2 \quad \text{and} \quad C(Q) = \frac{\Phi}{2}Q^2. \quad (11)$$

Consistent with Section 4.3.2, $\phi > 0$ is the weight on the profit generated by the agent's non-transferable investments (it measures the importance of the agent's moral hazard) and $\Phi > 0$ is the weight on the profit generated by the principal's non-transferable investments (it measures the importance of the principal's moral hazard). All of the qualitative results derived below also hold if the "importance of moral hazard" is measured by the effect of investment on revenue rather than on profit (i.e. ϕ and Φ do not multiply costs). This is because the linear specification shuts down the indirect effect discussed in Section 4.3.2. The results are almost identical: the only change in the expressions for optimal tariffs and profits below is that ϕ and Φ are everywhere replaced with ϕ^2 and Φ^2 respectively.

When spillovers are negative ($x < 0$), revenue R is decreasing in \bar{a}_{-i} , which means that in \mathcal{A} -mode the transferable actions a_i are set too high. Conversely, when spillovers are positive ($x > 0$), revenue R is increasing in \bar{a}_{-i} , so that in \mathcal{A} -mode the a_i 's are set too low. The particular specification we use in which x multiplies $\bar{a}_{-i} - a_i$ rather than just \bar{a}_{-i} reflects that it is usually not the absolute level of other agents' actions that creates a spillover, but whether an agent's level of action (investment) is above or below the average level of other agents. This normalization also simplifies the analysis.

We also assume

$$\beta > 0, \quad x < \beta \quad \text{and} \quad x \left(1 - \frac{x}{\beta}\right) < N\Phi, \quad (12)$$

which ensures that (i) $R(a_i, \bar{a}_{-i}, q_i, Q)$ is increasing in a_i , (ii) all optimization problems are well defined, and (iii) the optimal variable fees in both modes ($t^{\mathcal{P}^*}$ and $t^{\mathcal{A}^*}$) are strictly between 0 and 1. Note that all $x < 0$ are permissible under (12).

We obtain (all calculations are available in the [online appendix](#))

$$t^{\mathcal{P}^*} = \frac{\beta + N\Phi}{\beta + \phi + N\Phi} \quad \text{and} \quad t^{\mathcal{A}^*} = \frac{N\Phi - \frac{x}{\beta}(\beta - x)}{\frac{1}{\beta}(\beta - x)^2 + \phi + N\Phi}$$

and the following proposition.¹⁹

Proposition 6 *The principal prefers the \mathcal{A} -mode to the \mathcal{P} -mode if and only if*

$$\left| x \frac{\phi}{\beta} + \beta + N\Phi \right| < \sqrt{\beta(\beta + \phi + N\Phi) + \phi^2}. \quad (13)$$

¹⁹It is straightforward to verify that neither (13), nor the reverse condition are ruled out by assumptions (12). Thus, the proposition identifies a meaningful tradeoff.

Consider first the baseline case with no spillovers, i.e. $x = 0$. Then the principal prefers the \mathcal{A} -mode to the \mathcal{P} -mode if and only if

$$\phi > N\Phi. \tag{14}$$

In other words, the principal prefers the \mathcal{A} -mode if the agents' moral hazard is more important than the principal's moral hazard, consistent with the intuition developed in Section 4.3.2. Moreover, the tradeoff does not depend on β , the impact of the transferable action on revenues. The reason is that in both modes the share of revenues retained by the party that chooses the transferable action (t^{E*} in \mathcal{P} -mode and $(1 - t^{A*})$ in \mathcal{A} -mode) is increasing in β . Since t^{E*} and $(1 - t^{A*})$ increase in β at the same rate in this particular example (due to the symmetry of \mathcal{P} -mode and \mathcal{A} -mode profits in $N\Phi$ and ϕ), the resulting tradeoff does not depend on β .

Consider now the tradeoff for general x . If $\beta + N\Phi < \sqrt{\beta(\beta + \phi + N\Phi) + \phi^2}$ (which is equivalent to $\phi > N\Phi$ given that all parameters are positive), so that moral hazard considerations favor the \mathcal{A} -mode, then the \mathcal{A} -mode is preferred if and only if the magnitude of spillovers $|x|$ is not too large. Indeed, for large spillovers, the coordination benefits of the \mathcal{P} -mode dominate. On the other hand, if $\phi < N\Phi$, so that moral hazard considerations favor the \mathcal{P} -mode, then the \mathcal{A} -mode is still preferred for an intermediate, bounded range of negative spillovers. To understand why, recall that in \mathcal{A} -mode, negative spillovers cause the agents to set their a_i 's too high relative to what the principal would like them to choose all else equal. But this implies that in \mathcal{A} -mode, negative spillovers help offset to a certain extent the primary revenue distortion, i.e. a_i 's being set too low because the party choosing a_i does not receive the full marginal return when $0 < t < 1$. When this offsetting effect is moderately strong (i.e. the magnitude of negative spillovers is not too large), the resulting levels of a_i 's are closer to first-best in \mathcal{A} -mode than in \mathcal{P} -mode, so the \mathcal{A} -mode can dominate (this advantage of \mathcal{A} -mode must still be traded-off against the moral hazard advantage of the \mathcal{P} -mode when $\phi < N\Phi$). When the offsetting effect becomes too strong, the resulting levels of a_i 's in \mathcal{A} -mode are too far above the first-best levels, so the \mathcal{P} -mode dominates again.

Inspection of (13) reveals that the range of spillover values x for which the principal prefers the \mathcal{A} -mode is skewed towards negative values, consistent with the explanation in the previous paragraph. Positive spillovers cause the a_i 's to be set too low in \mathcal{A} -mode, which exacerbates the primary revenue distortion. This makes the \mathcal{A} -mode relatively less likely to dominate. There still exists a range of positive spillovers for which the \mathcal{A} -mode is preferred provided the agents' moral hazard is more important than that of the principal, but that range is smaller than the corresponding range of negative spillovers.

The skew towards negative values of x in condition (13) also implies that, if spillovers are moderately negative, then an increase in their magnitude (i.e. a *decrease* in x) shifts the trade-off in favor of the \mathcal{A} -mode.²⁰ This result runs counter to the common intuition, according to which spillovers should always make centralized control (i.e. \mathcal{P} -mode in our model) more desirable due to the ability to coordinate decisions. The reason behind this counterintuitive result is that, when spillovers are moderately negative and their magnitude increases, the \mathcal{A} -mode levels of a_i 's get closer to the

²⁰Specifically, if $-\beta - N\Phi < x \frac{\phi}{\beta} < 0$, then condition (13) is more likely to hold when x decreases.

first-best level through the offsetting effect described above, so the \mathcal{A} -mode becomes relatively more attractive (the \mathcal{P} -mode levels of a_i 's are unchanged). If spillovers are positive or very negative, then an increase in their magnitude moves the \mathcal{A} -mode levels of a_i 's away from the first-best level, so the standard effect is restored.

We can interpret this result in the context of one of the examples noted in Section 3, namely consultancies. If promoting an individual consultant steals business from the other consultants in the same consulting firm (negative spillovers), then consultants do too much self-promotion when they are independent contractors (\mathcal{A} -mode), relative to what the firm would choose, other things equal. But this effect can help compensate for sub-optimal incentives to invest in marketing whenever the commission paid to consultants is less than 100%. In this context, if the business-stealing effect of self-promotion across consultants is moderate, then an increase in its magnitude can make the \mathcal{A} -mode relatively more desirable, by allowing the firm to pay lower commissions while keeping consultants' incentives constant.

Next, we investigate the impact of ϕ and $N\Phi$ on the tradeoff between \mathcal{A} -mode and \mathcal{P} -mode, by considering their effect on the profit differential $\Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*} - \Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*}$. From (13), this impact seems difficult to ascertain. Fortunately, one can use first-order conditions and the envelope theorem, which lead to simple conditions (see the [online appendix](#) for calculations).

Proposition 7 *A larger ϕ shifts the tradeoff in favor of \mathcal{A} -mode (i.e. $\frac{d(\Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*} - \Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*})}{d\phi} > 0$) if and only if $t^{\mathcal{A}^*} < t^{\mathcal{P}^*}$. A larger Φ shifts the tradeoff in favor of \mathcal{P} -mode (i.e. $\frac{d(\Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*} - \Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*})}{d(N\Phi)} < 0$) if and only if $t^{\mathcal{A}^*} < t^{\mathcal{P}^*}$.*

Thus, the effects of both types of moral hazard on the tradeoff (and their interpretation) are the same as in Proposition 4 whenever the share of revenues retained by the principal is larger in \mathcal{P} -mode, i.e. $t^{\mathcal{P}^*} > t^{\mathcal{A}^*}$. The key difference is that now the presence of spillovers makes it possible to have $t^{\mathcal{A}^*} > t^{\mathcal{P}^*}$ (this was never possible in the model with one agent and additive separability across the three types of actions). In particular, this arises if and only if

$$\frac{x}{\beta} + \frac{\beta}{\beta - x} < -\frac{\beta + N\Phi}{\phi}, \quad (15)$$

i.e. if the spillover x is sufficiently negative.²¹ Thus, when the inequality in (15) holds, an increase in the importance of the agents' (respectively, the principal's) moral hazard shifts the trade-off in favor of the \mathcal{P} -mode (respectively, \mathcal{A} -mode). This is the opposite of the baseline tradeoff without spillovers given by (14), which is a special case of the result in Proposition 4.

The interpretation of this counter-intuitive result runs as follows. Negative spillovers partially offset the revenue-sharing distortion in \mathcal{A} -mode. As a result, a higher t induces less distortion of the transferable actions a_i in \mathcal{A} -mode, so the principal can charge a higher t in \mathcal{A} -mode, to the point

²¹Recall that all $x < 0$ are permissible by assumptions (12). Furthermore, it is easily verified that the respective ranges in x defined by (13) and (15) have a non-empty intersection.

that $t^{\mathcal{A}^*} > t^{\mathcal{P}^*}$ if spillovers are sufficiently negative. However, when this occurs, agents retain a lower share of revenues in \mathcal{A} -mode than in \mathcal{P} -mode, so the level of non-transferable effort q_i they choose is *lower* in \mathcal{A} -mode. Consequently, when the agents' moral hazard becomes more important in this parameter region, the \mathcal{P} -mode becomes relatively more attractive. Similarly, when the principal's moral hazard becomes more important in the same parameter region, the \mathcal{A} -mode becomes relatively more attractive.

Finally, the linear example used in this section implicitly assumes that the price to customers is fixed, so is held the same across the two modes, and that there are no production costs. These are not critical assumptions. In the [online appendix](#), we show that Proposition 6 remains unchanged even if the principal chooses price along with the fees (t, T) in its contract, and there are production costs. In other words, the trade-off between the two modes remains the same, even though the profit-maximizing price will differ across the two modes (it is higher for the mode generating higher profits).

5.2 Price as the transferable action

We now turn to the other case of interest identified above—the transferable action is price and therefore is costless. As pointed out in Section 4.1, spillovers are necessary in order for a costless action to generate a tradeoff between \mathcal{A} -mode and \mathcal{P} -mode. The revenue generated by agent i is now

$$R(p_i, \bar{p}_{-i}, q_i, Q) = p_i (d + \beta p_i + x (\bar{p}_{-i} - p_i) + \phi q_i + \Phi Q), \quad (16)$$

where $d > 0$ is the demand intercept and \bar{p}_{-i} is the average of the prices chosen for $j \neq i$. Thus, the revenue function is not additively separable, although the underlying demand function is. The costs of the non-transferable actions remain the same as in Section 5.1.²²

To ensure that $R(p_i, \bar{p}_{-i}, q_i, Q)$ is increasing in p_i and that all optimization problems are well defined, we assume

$$2\beta + \max\{N\Phi, \phi\} < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad 2\beta + \max\{N\Phi, \phi\} < 2x. \quad (17)$$

Note that these assumptions imply that $\beta < 0$, as is natural.

From (16), positive spillovers ($x > 0$) correspond to the usual case with prices: when other agents increase their prices, this increases the demand faced by agent i . Also, one could reinterpret p_i as quantity instead of price, but then the usual case would be captured by negative spillovers ($x < 0$).

Define

$$k \equiv \frac{N\Phi\phi}{N\Phi + \phi} \in (0, |\beta|),$$

which can be viewed as a measure of the combined importance of the agent's and principal's moral hazards (k is symmetric in $N\Phi$ and ϕ , and increasing in both).

We then obtain the following proposition (calculations are in the [online appendix](#)).²³

²²If costs do not depend on ϕ and Φ , then the results below are identical except that the parameters ϕ and Φ are everywhere squared.

²³Recall $0 < k < -\beta$ so $-\frac{4k(k+\beta)}{k+2\beta} < 0$. Furthermore, the proposition identifies a meaningful tradeoff since any positive

Proposition 8 *The principal prefers the \mathcal{A} -mode if and only if*

$$-\frac{4k(k+\beta)}{k+2\beta} < x < 0. \quad (18)$$

Thus, the \mathcal{P} -mode is preferred if spillovers are positive or very negative. The logic here is somewhat different from the case with costly transferable actions. Given that the transferable action here (price) does not carry any costs, there is no distortion of price in either mode due to revenue-sharing between the principal and each agent. As a result, the variable fee t can be used in both modes to balance double-sided moral hazard (q_i versus Q) equally well. As before, the \mathcal{P} -mode has an advantage in internalizing pricing spillovers across the agents' services. However, due to the strategic complementarity between p_i and (q_i, Q) , the level of p_i chosen can either offset or compound the effects of double-sided moral hazard, depending on the sign of the spillovers.

When spillovers are negative ($x < 0$), the fact that agents do not internalize spillovers in \mathcal{A} -mode can work in favor of the \mathcal{A} -mode. Namely, when $x < 0$, the \mathcal{A} -mode leads to an excessively high level of p_i , which can help offset the effects of double-sided moral hazard. If this offsetting effect is moderately strong, then the resulting levels of q_i 's and Q are closer to first-best in \mathcal{A} -mode than in \mathcal{P} -mode, so the \mathcal{A} -mode dominates. If the offsetting effect is too strong, then negative spillovers over-compensate and the resulting levels of q_i 's and Q in \mathcal{A} -mode are too far above the first-best levels, so the \mathcal{P} -mode is preferred. In contrast, when $x > 0$, the \mathcal{A} -mode leads to p_i being set too low, which compounds the effects of double-sided moral hazard. As a result, the \mathcal{P} -mode always dominates in that case.

We can interpret the result that negative spillovers across agents' prices can favor the \mathcal{A} -mode in the context of the franchising example. When one franchisee increases its price, this also steers consumers away from other franchisees. As discussed above, this reflects the over-arching importance of the brand of the franchisor, which leads to positive demand externalities. In turn, this implies that independent franchisees tend to set their prices too high relative to what the franchisor would find optimal, so the latter would prefer to control prices (Blair and Lafontaine, 2005, chapter 7). However, our analysis suggests that the excessive prices charged by independent franchisees can help offset the insufficient on-going investments by both the franchisees and the franchisor due to revenue sharing, so giving franchisees discretion over prices will sometimes be preferred.

Third, the parameters measuring the importance of moral hazard for the principal and agent, $N\Phi$ and ϕ , have the same effect on the tradeoff between the two modes (through k). This result stands in contrast to the linear example with costly transferable actions, where $N\Phi$ and ϕ always had opposite effects on the tradeoff between the two modes. The explanation is as follows. Since the transferable action (price) is not distorted by the variable fee t in either mode, both modes do just as well in terms of balancing the double-sided moral hazard problem. Thus, the extent to which the \mathcal{A} -mode is preferred over the \mathcal{P} -mode when moral hazard becomes more important does not depend on the source of the moral hazard, but only on its aggregate magnitude, measured by k .

x and any x satisfying (18) also satisfy (17) provided β is sufficiently negative.

6 Conclusion

By substantially reducing the costs of communication and of monitoring revenues generated by independent contractors, Internet and mobile technologies have made it possible to build marketplaces and platforms for a rapidly increasing variety of services. Consequently, the choice facing firms of whether to control the provision of services to customers by employing workers or whether to enable independent contractors to take control of service provision, and the associated tradeoffs that we have examined in this paper are becoming increasingly relevant in a growing number of industries.

At the most fundamental level, we have shown that the tradeoffs arise from the need to balance double-sided moral hazard, while at the same time minimizing distortions in the choice of transferable actions due to revenue sharing. This implies that low-powered incentives (control over the transferable actions) should be aligned with high-powered incentives (higher share of revenues), a mechanism which underlies most of our key results. Spillovers across the transferable decisions of different agents introduce an additional distortion. Depending on whether the spillover-induced distortion exacerbates the revenue-sharing distortion or offsets it, spillovers may shift the baseline tradeoff in favor of the \mathcal{P} -mode (as standard intuition would suggest) or in favor of the \mathcal{A} -mode (with counter-intuitive consequences).

Our analysis is relevant to current legal and regulatory debates about whether professionals that work through “sharing economy” service platforms (e.g. Handy, Lyft, Postmates, Uber) should be classified as employees rather than as independent contractors.²⁴ All existing legal definitions emphasize control rights as the most important factor in determining this issue, which is consistent with our modelling approach. However, drawing the distinction between employees and independent contractors solely based on control rights is notoriously difficult. The results in this paper suggest a practical approach that could be used by courts, based on the share of variable revenues (net of production costs) kept by workers: when this share is above 50%, it is an indication that the firm has given key control rights to the workers, consistent with them being independent contractors. The higher the share, the more confidence the court can have in drawing this conclusion.

In addition to exploring the robustness of this conclusion to various extensions of the model, future research could also examine the proper boundary between employees and independent contractors (as a matter of public policy) by extending our model to also incorporate uncertainty, agent risk-aversion and fixed costs of providing agent benefits. Indeed, in our current model, any fixed cost that would be borne by the principal when it employs the agent and by the agent when the agent is an independent contractor (e.g. health insurance and worker tax filings) makes no difference to the principal’s choice of which party to give decision rights to. Even if independent contractors incur the fixed cost, it will be internalized through a lower fixed fee charged to these agents because the agents’ outside option remains unchanged. This is no longer true when the fixed fees charged (or, equivalently, the fixed wages paid) by the principal are constrained by the agents’ risk-aversion or budget constraints. As a result, in this case the principal’s choice of mode is materially impacted by the assignment of fixed costs to one party or the other, which captures how the legal classification of employment is done.

²⁴See for example Justin Fox [“Uber and the Not-Quite-Independent Contractor”](#) Bloomberg, June 30, 2015.

This would lead to a normative theory of how to most efficiently classify workers and the implications of getting the classification wrong.

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7 Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1

Given an allocation of control rights $D \subset \{1, \dots, M\}$, the principal’s optimal contract $\Omega^*(\cdot)$ solves

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi^*(D) &= \max_{\Omega(\cdot), \mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}} \{R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) - \Omega(R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q})) - f(\mathbf{a}) - C(\mathbf{Q})\} \\ &\text{s.t.} \\ &a^i = \arg \max_a \{R(a^1, \dots, a^{i-1}, a, a^{i+1}, \dots, a^{M_a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) - \Omega(R(a^1, \dots, a^{i-1}, a, a^{i+1}, \dots, a^{M_a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q})) - f^i(a)\} \\ &a^i = \arg \max_a \{\Omega(R(a^1, \dots, a^{i-1}, a, a^{i+1}, \dots, a^{M_a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q})) - f^i(a)\} \text{ for } i \in \{1, \dots, M\} \setminus D \\ &\mathbf{q} = \arg \max_{\mathbf{q}'} \{\Omega(R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}', \mathbf{Q})) - c(\mathbf{q}')\} \\ &\mathbf{Q} = \arg \max_{\mathbf{Q}'} \{R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}') - \Omega(R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}')) - C(\mathbf{Q}')\} \\ &0 \leq \Omega(R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q})) - c(\mathbf{q}). \end{aligned}$$

Let $(\mathbf{a}^*, \mathbf{q}^*, \mathbf{Q}^*)$ denote the outcome of this optimization problem and define $R^* \equiv R(\mathbf{a}^*, \mathbf{q}^*, \mathbf{Q}^*)$.

In the [online appendix](#) we prove the following technical lemma.

Lemma 2 $\Omega^*(\cdot)$ is continuous and differentiable at R^* .

The lemma and program (19) imply that $(\mathbf{a}^*, \mathbf{q}^*, \mathbf{Q}^*)$ solve

$$\begin{cases} (1 - \Omega_R^*(R^*)) R_{a^i}(\mathbf{a}^*, \mathbf{q}^*, \mathbf{Q}^*) = f_{a^i}^i(a^{*i}) & \text{for } i \in D \\ \Omega_R^*(R^*) R_{a^i}(\mathbf{a}^*, \mathbf{q}^*, \mathbf{Q}^*) = f_{a^i}^i(a^{*i}) & \text{for } i \in \{1, \dots, M\} \setminus D \\ \Omega_R^*(R^*) R_{q^j}(\mathbf{a}^*, \mathbf{q}^*, \mathbf{Q}^*) = c_{q^j}^j(q^{*j}) & \text{for } j \in \{1, \dots, M_q\} \\ (1 - \Omega_R^*(R^*)) R_{Q^k}(\mathbf{a}^*, \mathbf{q}^*, \mathbf{Q}^*) = C_{Q^k}(Q^{*k}) & \text{for } k \in \{1, \dots, M_Q\}. \end{cases}$$

Let $t^* \equiv 1 - \Omega_R^*(R^*)$ and $T^* \equiv (1 - t^*) R^* - \Omega^*(R^*)$. Clearly, the linear contract $\widehat{\Omega}(R) = (1 - t^*) R - T^*$ can generate the same stage-2 symmetric Nash equilibrium $(\mathbf{a}^*, \mathbf{q}^*, \mathbf{Q}^*)$ as the initial contract $\Omega^*(R)$. Furthermore, both $\Omega^*(R)$ and $\widehat{\Omega}(R)$ cause the agents' participation constraint to bind and therefore result in the same profits for the principal.

Proof of Proposition 1

Suppose the principal chooses t and $D \subset \{1, \dots, M_a\}$ as the subset of transferable decisions that it controls (the agent is therefore given control over decisions $j \in \{1, \dots, M_a\} \setminus D$). Let $\tau(D, t)$ be the vector of $M_a + M_q + M_Q$ coordinates defined as follows:

$$\tau^i(D, t) = \begin{cases} t & \text{if } i \in D \cup \{M_a + M_q + 1, \dots, M_a + M_q + M_Q\} \\ 1 - t & \text{if } i \in (\{1, \dots, M_a\} \setminus D) \cup \{M_a + 1, \dots, M_a + M_q\}. \end{cases}$$

Recall also from assumption (a5) that

$$\Pi(\tau) \equiv R(\mathbf{a}(\tau), \mathbf{q}(\tau), \mathbf{Q}(\tau)) - f(\mathbf{a}(\tau)) - c(\mathbf{q}(\tau)) - C(\mathbf{Q}(\tau)),$$

where $(\mathbf{a}(\tau), \mathbf{q}(\tau), \mathbf{Q}(\tau))$ is the unique solution to

$$\begin{cases} \tau^j R_{a^j}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) = f_{a^j}^j(a^j) & \text{for } j \in \{1, \dots, M_a\} \\ \tau^{M_a+k} R_{q^k}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) = c_{q^k}^k(q^k) & \text{for } k \in \{1, \dots, M_q\} \\ \tau^{M_a+M_q+l} R_{Q^l}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) = C_{Q^l}^l(Q^l) & \text{for } l \in \{1, \dots, M_Q\} \end{cases}$$

Then the profit obtained by the principal is equal to $\Pi(\tau(D, t))$.

Consider part (1) of the Proposition first. Denote by t^* the optimal variable fee and by $(D^*, \{1, \dots, M_a\} \setminus D^*)$ the optimal allocation of control rights over the transferable actions. Suppose $D^* \neq \emptyset$ and $D^* \neq \{1, \dots, M_a\}$. If $t^* < 1 - t^*$ (i.e. $t^* < 1/2$), then the principal could increase profits by giving up control over all actions a_j for $j \in D^*$ to the agent and keeping t^* unchanged. To see this, note that the change in profits is $\Pi(\tau(\emptyset, t^*)) - \Pi(\tau(D^*, t^*))$. If $t^* > 0$, then (a5) implies this difference is positive, because $0 < t^* < 1 - t^* < 1$ and $D^* \neq \emptyset$ imply $\tau(D^*, t^*) \in [0, 1]^{M_a+M_q+M_Q}$, $\tau(\emptyset, t^*) \in [0, 1]^{M_a+M_q+M_Q}$ and

$\tau(\emptyset, t^*) > \tau(D^*, t^*)$. If $t^* = 0$, then the change in profits can be written

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi(\tau(\emptyset, 0)) - \Pi(\tau(D^*, 0)) &= \max_{\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}} \{R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q} = \mathbf{0}) - f(\mathbf{a}) - c(\mathbf{q})\} \\ &\quad - \left(\max_{\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}} \{R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q} = \mathbf{0}) - f(\mathbf{a}) - c(\mathbf{q})\} \right. \\ &\quad \left. \text{s.t. } a^j = 0 \text{ if } j \in D^* \right). \end{aligned}$$

In this case, $D^* \neq \emptyset$ and (a1)-(a4) imply $\Pi(\tau(\emptyset, 0)) - \Pi(\tau(D^*, 0)) > 0$.

By a symmetric argument, if $t^* > 1 - t^*$, then the principal could increase profits by taking control over all actions $j \in \{1, \dots, M_a\} \setminus D^*$ and keeping t^* unchanged.

Finally, if $t^* = 1/2$, then any allocation of control rights yields the same payoffs, so the pure modes remain weakly optimal.

Let us now turn to part (2) of the proposition. Consider the \mathcal{P} -mode. If $t^{\mathcal{P}^*} < 1/2$, then the principal could increase profits by giving up control over the transferable actions to the agent and keeping the variable fee unchanged, equal to $t^{\mathcal{P}^*}$. To see this, note that the change in profits is $\Pi(\tau(\emptyset, t^{\mathcal{P}^*})) - \Pi(\tau(\{1, \dots, M_a\}, t^{\mathcal{P}^*}))$. If $t^{\mathcal{P}^*} > 0$, then (a5) implies this difference is positive, because $0 < t^{\mathcal{P}^*} < 1/2$ implies $\tau(\emptyset, t^{\mathcal{P}^*}) \in (0, 1)^{M_a + M_q + M_Q}$, $\tau(\{1, \dots, M_a\}, t^{\mathcal{P}^*}) \in (0, 1)^{M_a + M_q + M_Q}$ and $\tau(\emptyset, t^{\mathcal{P}^*}) > \tau(\{1, \dots, M_a\}, t^{\mathcal{P}^*})$. If $t^{\mathcal{P}^*} = 0$, then the change in profits is

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pi(\tau(\emptyset, 0)) - \Pi(\tau(\{1, \dots, M_a\}, 0)) \\ &= \max_{\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}} \{R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q} = \mathbf{0}) - f(\mathbf{a}) - c(\mathbf{q})\} - \max_{\mathbf{q}} \{R(\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q} = \mathbf{0}) - c(\mathbf{q})\}, \end{aligned}$$

which is positive due to (a1)-(a4). Thus, if $t^{\mathcal{P}^*} < 1/2$, then

$$\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} = \Pi(\tau(\{1, \dots, M_a\}, t^{\mathcal{P}^*})) < \Pi(\tau(\emptyset, t^{\mathcal{P}^*})) \leq \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}.$$

If $t^{\mathcal{P}^*} = 1/2$, then

$$\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} = \Pi(\tau(\{1, \dots, M_a\}, t^{\mathcal{P}^*})) = \Pi(\tau(\emptyset, t^{\mathcal{P}^*})) \leq \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}.$$

Therefore, $\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} > \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}$ implies $t^{\mathcal{P}^*} > 1/2$ and $\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} = \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}$ implies $t^{\mathcal{P}^*} \geq 1/2$.

By a symmetric argument, $\Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*} > \Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*}$ implies $t^{\mathcal{A}^*} < 1/2$ and $\Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*} = \Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*}$ implies $t^{\mathcal{A}^*} \leq 1/2$.

7.1 Proof of Proposition 3

Suppose R is additively separable in all its arguments, i.e.

$$R(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{Q}) = \sum_{i=1}^{M_a} R^{a^i}(a^i) + \sum_{j=1}^{M_q} R^{q^j}(q^j) + \sum_{k=1}^{M_Q} R^{Q^k}(Q^k).$$

For any $t \in [0, 1]$, define

$$\begin{aligned}\pi^{a^i}(a) &\equiv R^{a^i}(a) - f^i(a) \text{ and } a^i(t) \equiv \arg \max_a \left\{ tR^{a^i}(a) - f^i(a) \right\} \text{ for all } i \in \{1, \dots, M_a\} \\ \pi^{q^j}(q) &\equiv R^{q^j}(q) - c^j(q) \text{ and } q^j(t) \equiv \arg \max_q \left\{ tR^{q^j}(q) - c^j(q) \right\} \text{ for all } j \in \{1, \dots, M_q\} \\ \pi^{Q^k}(Q) &\equiv R^{Q^k}(Q) - C^k(Q) \text{ and } Q^k(t) \equiv \arg \max_Q \left\{ tR^{Q^k}(Q) - C^k(Q) \right\} \text{ for all } k \in \{1, \dots, M_Q\}.\end{aligned}$$

Assumptions (a2)-(a3) imply that $\pi^{a^i}(a^i(t))$, $\pi^{q^j}(q^j(t))$ and $\pi^{Q^k}(Q^k(t))$ are all increasing in t . Then, when all q^j 's are non-contractible, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} &= \max_t \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{M_a} \pi^{a^i}(a^i(t)) + \sum_{j=1}^{M_q} \pi^{q^j}(q^j(1-t)) + \sum_{k=1}^{M_Q} \pi^{Q^k}(Q^k(t)) \right\} \\ \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*} &= \max_t \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{M_a} \pi^{a^i}(a^i(1-t)) + \sum_{j=1}^{M_q} \pi^{q^j}(q^j(1-t)) + \sum_{k=1}^{M_Q} \pi^{Q^k}(Q^k(t)) \right\}.\end{aligned}$$

After q^1 becomes contractible, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{P}^*} &= \max_t \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{M_a} \pi^{a^i}(a^i(t)) + \sum_{j=2}^{M_q} \pi^{q^j}(q^j(1-t)) + \sum_{k=1}^{M_Q} \pi^{Q^k}(Q^k(t)) \right\} + \max_q \left\{ \pi^{q^1}(q) \right\} \\ \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{A}^*} &= \max_t \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{M_a} \pi^{a^i}(a^i(1-t)) + \sum_{j=2}^{M_q} \pi^{q^j}(q^j(1-t)) + \sum_{k=1}^{M_Q} \pi^{Q^k}(Q^k(t)) \right\} + \max_q \left\{ \pi^{q^1}(q) \right\}.\end{aligned}$$

Define then for all $x \in [0, 1]$:

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(x) &\equiv \max_t \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{M_a} \pi^{a^i}(a^i(t)) + \left(x\pi^{q^1}(q^1(1-t)) + \sum_{j=2}^{M_q} \pi^{q^j}(q^j(1-t)) \right) + \sum_{k=1}^{M_Q} \pi^{Q^k}(Q^k(t)) \right\} \\ &\quad + (1-x) \max_q \left\{ \pi^{q^1}(q) \right\} \\ \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(x) &\equiv \max_t \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{M_a} \pi^{a^i}(a^i(1-t)) + \left(x\pi^{q^1}(q^1(1-t)) + \sum_{j=2}^{M_q} \pi^{q^j}(q^j(1-t)) \right) + \sum_{k=1}^{M_Q} \pi^{Q^k}(Q^k(t)) \right\} \\ &\quad + (1-x) \max_q \left\{ \pi^{q^1}(q) \right\}.\end{aligned}$$

Clearly, $\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} = \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(1)$, $\tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{P}^*} = \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(0)$, $\Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*} = \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(1)$ and $\tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{A}^*} = \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(0)$. Let also

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{t}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(x) &\equiv \arg \max_t \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{M_a} \pi^{a^i} (a^i(t)) + \left(x\pi^{q^1} (q^1(1-t)) + \sum_{j=2}^{M_q} \pi^{q^j} (q^j(1-t)) \right) + \sum_{k=1}^{M_Q} \pi^{Q^k} (Q^k(t)) \right\} \\ \tilde{t}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(x) &\equiv \arg \max_t \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{M_a} \pi^{a^i} (a^i(1-t)) + \left(x\pi^{q^1} (q^1(1-t)) + \sum_{j=2}^{M_q} \pi^{q^j} (q^j(1-t)) \right) + \sum_{k=1}^{M_Q} \pi^{Q^k} (Q^k(t)) \right\}.\end{aligned}$$

We have $\tilde{t}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(x) \geq \tilde{t}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(x)$ for all $x \in [0, 1]$. This implies

$$\frac{d \left(\tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(x) - \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(x) \right)}{dx} = \pi^{q^1} (q^1(1 - \tilde{t}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(x))) - \pi^{q^1} (q^1(1 - \tilde{t}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(x))) \leq 0.$$

If $\tilde{t}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(x) > \tilde{t}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(x)$ for some $x \in [0, 1]$, then $\tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(x) - \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(x)$ is decreasing in x on a positive-measure interval of $[0, 1]$, so we can directly conclude

$$\tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{P}^*} - \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{A}^*} = \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(0) - \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(0) > \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(1) - \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(1) = \Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*} - \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}.$$

I.e., making q^1 contractible shifts the tradeoff in favor of the \mathcal{P} -mode.

If $\tilde{t}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(x) = \tilde{t}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(x)$ for all $x \in [0, 1]$, then there are only two possibilities:

- $\tilde{t}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(x) = \tilde{t}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(x) = 0$ for all $x \in [0, 1]$, which implies $\tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(x) < \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(x)$ for all $x \in [0, 1]$.
- $\tilde{t}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(x) = \tilde{t}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(x) = 1$ for all $x \in [0, 1]$, which implies $\tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(x) > \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(x)$ for all $x \in [0, 1]$.

In both cases, making q^1 contractible trivially shifts the tradeoff in favor of the \mathcal{P} -mode. By a symmetric argument, making Q^1 contractible shifts the tradeoff in favor of the \mathcal{A} -mode.

7.2 Proofs of Propositions 4 and 5

We use some common notation for both proofs. For all $(w, z) \in [0, 1]^2$, define:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi^a(\mathbf{a}) &\equiv R^a(\mathbf{a}) - f(\mathbf{a}) \text{ and } \mathbf{a}(z) \equiv \arg \max_{\mathbf{a}} \{zR^a(\mathbf{a}) - f(\mathbf{a})\} \\ \pi^q(\mathbf{q}, w) &\equiv wR^q(\mathbf{q}) - c(\mathbf{q}) \text{ and } \mathbf{q}(z) \equiv \arg \max_{\mathbf{q}} \{zR^q(\mathbf{q}) - c(\mathbf{q})\} \\ \pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}, w) &\equiv wR^Q(\mathbf{Q}) - C(\mathbf{Q}) \text{ and } \mathbf{Q}(z) \equiv \arg \max_{\mathbf{Q}} \{zR^Q(\mathbf{Q}) - C(\mathbf{Q})\}.\end{aligned}$$

Assumption (a5) implies $\pi^a(\mathbf{a}(z))$ is increasing in z , while $\pi^q(\mathbf{q}(z), w)$ and $\pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(z), w)$ are increasing in z for all $w \geq z$.

7.2.1 Proof of Proposition 4

The principal's profits in each mode as functions of (ϕ, Φ) can be written as

$$\begin{aligned}\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi) &\equiv \max_t \{ \pi^a(\mathbf{a}(t)) + \phi \pi^q(\mathbf{q}(1-t), 1) + \Phi \pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(t), 1) \} \\ \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi) &\equiv \max_t \{ \pi^a(\mathbf{a}(1-t)) + \phi \pi^q(\mathbf{q}(1-t), 1) + \Phi \pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(t), 1) \}.\end{aligned}$$

Also, denote by $t^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi)$ and $t^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi)$ the corresponding optimal variable fees

$$\begin{aligned}t^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi) &\equiv \arg \max_t \{ \pi^a(\mathbf{a}(t)) + \phi \pi^q(\mathbf{q}(1-t), 1) + \Phi \pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(t), 1) \} \\ t^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi) &\equiv \arg \max_t \{ \pi^a(\mathbf{a}(1-t)) + \phi \pi^q(\mathbf{q}(1-t), 1) + \Phi \pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(t), 1) \}.\end{aligned}$$

Because $\pi^a(\mathbf{a}(t))$, $\pi^q(\mathbf{q}(t), 1)$ and $\pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(t), 1)$ are increasing in t , we have $t^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi) \leq t^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi)$, which implies

$$\pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(t^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi)), 1) \leq \pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(t^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi)), 1) \text{ and } \pi^q(\mathbf{q}(1-t^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi)), 1) \geq \pi^q(\mathbf{q}(1-t^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi)), 1).$$

Thus, using the envelope theorem, we have

$$\frac{d(\Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi) - \Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi))}{d\phi} = \pi^q(\mathbf{q}(1-t^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi)), 1) - \pi^q(\mathbf{q}(1-t^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi)), 1) \geq 0 \quad (20)$$

$$\frac{d(\Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi) - \Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi))}{d\Phi} = \pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(t^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi)), 1) - \pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(t^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi)), 1) \leq 0. \quad (21)$$

If $t^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi) < t^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi)$, then the last two inequalities are strict, so any increase in ϕ (respectively, in Φ) shifts the tradeoff in favor of the \mathcal{A} -mode (respectively, \mathcal{P} -mode).

If $t^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi) = t^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi)$, then there are only two possibilities:

- $t^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi) = t^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi) = 0$ (which occurs when ϕ is very large relative to Φ), so $\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi) < \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi)$. Combined with (20), this implies that any increase in ϕ shifts the tradeoff in favor of the \mathcal{A} -mode.
- $t^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi) = t^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi) = 1$ (which occurs when Φ is very large relative to ϕ), so $\Pi^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi) > \Pi^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi)$. Combined with (21), this implies that any increase in Φ shifts the tradeoff in favor of the \mathcal{P} -mode.

7.2.2 Proof of Proposition 5

The principal's profits in each mode as functions of (ϕ, Φ) can now be written

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi) &\equiv \max_t \{ \pi^a(\mathbf{a}(t)) + \pi^q(\mathbf{q}((1-t)\phi), \phi) + \pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(t\Phi), \Phi) \} \\ \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi) &\equiv \max_t \{ \pi^a(\mathbf{a}(1-t)) + \pi^q(\mathbf{q}((1-t)\phi), \phi) + \pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(t\Phi), \Phi) \}.\end{aligned}$$

Meanwhile, the corresponding optimal variable fees are

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{t}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi) &\equiv \arg \max_t \{ \pi^a(\mathbf{a}(t)) + \pi^q(\mathbf{q}((1-t)\phi), \phi) + \pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(t\Phi), \Phi) \} \\ \tilde{t}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi) &\equiv \arg \max_t \{ \pi^a(\mathbf{a}(1-t)) + \pi^q(\mathbf{q}((1-t)\phi), \phi) + \pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(t\Phi), \Phi) \}.\end{aligned}$$

Because $\pi^a(\mathbf{a}(t))$, $\pi^q(\mathbf{q}((1-t)\phi), \phi)$ and $\pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(t\Phi), \Phi)$ are increasing in t (note that $(1-t)\phi \leq \phi$ and $t\Phi \leq \Phi$), we have $\tilde{t}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi) \leq \tilde{t}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi)$, with equality only if $\tilde{t}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi) = \tilde{t}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi) = 0$ or $\tilde{t}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi) = \tilde{t}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi) = 1$. Using the envelope theorem, we have

$$\frac{d(\tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi) - \tilde{\Pi}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi))}{d\phi} = \left. \frac{d\pi^q(\mathbf{q}((1-t)\phi), \phi)}{d\phi} \right|_{t=\tilde{t}^{\mathcal{A}^*}(\phi, \Phi)} - \left. \frac{d\pi^q(\mathbf{q}((1-t)\phi), \phi)}{d\phi} \right|_{t=\tilde{t}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\phi, \Phi)}.$$

Thus, by the same reasoning as above, a sufficient condition for an increase in ϕ to shift the tradeoff in favor of the \mathcal{A} -mode is that $\frac{d\pi^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi), \phi)}{d\phi}$ increases with t . We have

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{d\pi^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi), \phi)}{d\phi} &= R^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi)) + \sum_{j=1}^{M_q} \left(\phi R_{q^j}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi)) - c_{q^j}^j(q^j(t\phi)) \right) t q_z^j(t\phi) \\ &= R^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi)) + t(1-t)\phi \sum_{j=1}^{M_q} R_{q^j}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi)) q_z^j(t\phi).\end{aligned}$$

Taking the derivative in t , we obtain

$$\frac{d^2\pi^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi), \phi)}{d\phi dt} = \sum_{j=1}^{M_q} \left(\begin{aligned} &2\phi(1-t)R_{q^j}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi))q_z^j(t\phi) + t(1-t)\phi^2R_{q^j}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi))q_{zz}^j(t\phi) \\ &+ t(1-t)\phi^2R_{q^j q^j}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi))(q_z^j(t\phi))^2 + t(1-t)\phi^2 \sum_{k \neq j} R_{q^j q^k}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi))q_z^j(t\phi)q_z^k(t\phi) \end{aligned} \right).$$

For all $j \in \{1, \dots, M_q\}$, the first order condition defining $q^j(t\phi)$ is

$$t\phi R_{q^j}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi)) - c_{q^j}^j(q^j(t\phi)) = 0.$$

Differentiating with respect to t , we obtain

$$\phi R_{q^j}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi)) + t\phi^2 R_{q^j q^j}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi)) q_z^j(t\phi) + t\phi^2 \sum_{k \neq j} R_{q^j q^k}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi)) q_z^k(t\phi) = \phi c_{q^j q^j}^j(q^j(t\phi)) q_z^j(t\phi).$$

Multiplying by $(1-t)q_z^j(t\phi)$, this is equivalent to

$$\begin{aligned}&\phi(1-t)R_{q^j}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi))q_z^j(t\phi) + t(1-t)\phi^2R_{q^j q^j}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi))(q_z^j(t\phi))^2 + t(1-t)\phi^2 \sum_{k \neq j} R_{q^j q^k}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi))q_z^j(t\phi)q_z^k(t\phi) \\ &= \phi c_{q^j q^j}^j(q^j(t\phi))(q_z^j(t\phi))^2.\end{aligned}$$

We can now plug this back into the last expression of $\frac{d^2\pi^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi),\phi)}{d\phi dt}$ to obtain

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{d^2\pi^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi),\phi)}{d\phi dt} &= \sum_{j=1}^{M_q} \left(\phi(1-t) R_{q^j}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi)) q_z^j(t\phi) + t(1-t) \phi^2 R_{q^j}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi)) q_{zz}^j(t\phi) + \phi c_{q^j q^j}^j(q^j(t\phi)) (q_z^j(t\phi))^2 \right) \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^{M_q} \left(\phi(1-t) R_{q^j}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi)) (q_z^j(t\phi) + t\phi q_{zz}^j(t\phi)) + \phi c_{q^j q^j}^j(q^j(t\phi)) (q_z^j(t\phi))^2 \right) \geq 0,\end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality follows from $c_{q^j q^j}^j \geq 0$ (assumption (a2)), $R_{q^j}^q(\mathbf{q}(t\phi)) \geq 0$ (assumption (a2) along with definition of $\mathbf{q}(t\phi)$) and $q_z^j(t\phi) + t\phi q_{zz}^j(t\phi) \geq 0$ (assumption in the text of Proposition 5).

By a symmetric argument, if $Q_z^k(z) + zQ_{zz}^k(z) \geq 0$ for all $k \in \{1, \dots, M_Q\}$ and $z \geq 0$, then $\frac{d^2\pi^Q(\mathbf{Q}(t\Phi),\Phi)}{d\Phi dt} \geq 0$, which implies that an increase in Φ shifts the tradeoff in favor of the \mathcal{P} -mode.