My research focuses on firms' organizational strategies, particularly those related to alliances and other collaborative strategies in international markets.

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Recent Publications and Working Papers:

"Let's Work it Out (Or we'll See You in Court): Litigation and Private Dispute Resolution in Vertical Exchange Relationships," Fabrice Lumineau & Joanne E. Oxley, Organization Science, forthcoming.

We examine how partners in vertical exchange relationships actually resolve disputes that are sufficiently serious to get lawyers involved. Reaching beyond the usual domain of organizational and management research we leverage findings from law and economics to offer a novel organizational perspective on litigation and private dispute resolution, and develop hypotheses about the likelihood of litigation in different exchange settings. Our empirical analysis generates three sets of new findings. First, counter to the received wisdom we see that the involvement of lawyers does not necessarily signal the bitter end of an exchange relationship, as firms frequently manage to avoid litigation and resolve their disputes privately, and do so in a manner that accords with our theoretical predictions. Second, we see that familiarity with exchange partners does not automatically lead to increased willingness to work things out: rather, our empirical results suggest that the impact of exchange duration on parties' willingness to resolve disputes privately is contingent on the development of norms of cooperation; in the event that such norms do not develop, the probability of a litigated outcome actually increases over time. Finally, we see that firms' willingness to work things out privately is also influenced positively by the shadow of the future. These findings are suggestive of a "discriminating alignment" between exchange characteristics and the choice of dispute resolution procedure, and thus inject important new evidence into ongoing discussions about the legal underpinnings of different governance forms.

"Vertical Relationships, Hostages, and Supplier Performance in the Japanese Automotive Industry," Christina L. Ahmadjian & Joanne E. Oxley, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. Advance Access published April 20, 2011, doi: 10.1093/jleo/ewr006.

Drawing on Williamson's (1983) hostage model and recent studies identifying equity affiliation as a robust hostage in the Japanese automotive industry we examine the relationship between automobile assemblers and their suppliers under different demand conditions. Specifically, we explore the extent to which assemblers buffer their equity-affiliated suppliers from demand fluctuations to a greater extent than is the case for unaffiliated suppliers. Our empirical analysis suggests that assemblers buffered their affiliated suppliers from the effects of a negative demand shock in 1992-1995, apparently favoring affiliates over unaffiliated suppliers during this period, as predicted by the hostage model. However, affiliates in our sample also more frequently adjust production to accommodate short-run demand fluctuations faced by the auto assemblers. We discuss how our findings relate to alternative theoretical explanations such as those featuring differential supplier capabilities, risk aversion, or supply assurance in the face of sticky price adjustments.

"Arms Race or Détente? How Inter-firm Alliance Announcements Change the Stock Market Valuation of Rivals," Joanne E. Oxley, Rachelle C. Sampson & Brian S. Silverman, Management Science 55, 2009: 1321-1337.

Most prior event studies find that the announcement of a new alliance is accompanied by a positive stock market response for the partners. This result has usually been interpreted as evidence for the prevailing view that alliances are effective vehicles for partners to acquire or access new skills and thus become stronger competitors. However, partners should also earn positive abnormal returns if alliances are used to shape competitive interactions, attenuating competitive intensity industry-wide.

In this study, we disentangle these different mechanisms by examining how alliance announcements affect the stock market's evaluation of allying firms' rivals: if an alliance is expected to make partner firms more competitive, this should lead to negative abnormal returns for partners' rivals; if an alliance is expected to facilitate a reduction in competitive intensity, this should lead to positive abnormal returns for rivals. Results from an event study analysis of research and development alliances in the telecommunications and electronics industries during 1996–2004 provide evidence consistent with competition attenuation in some alliances. Our research thus challenges the increasingly narrow focus on learning and resource accumulation through alliances, and calls for broader consideration of the roles and effects of collaboration, both for individual firms and for industry structure.

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"Alliance Structure and the Scope of Knowledge Transfer: Evidence from US-Japan Agreement," Joanne Oxley & Tetsuo Wada, Management Science 55, 2009:635-649.

Prior research suggests that equity joint ventures (JVs) are particularly effective vehicles for accessing complex technology. Different schools of thought have emphasized different reasons why joint ventures might support greater knowledge transfer than "bare" license agreements: incentive alignment, organizational embeddedness, and enhanced administrative controls. We probe and refine these theoretical perspectives, drawing out implications of the different theories for the extent and speed of alliance-related knowledge transfer, as well as for knowledge "leakage" in areas not directly related to alliance activities. Using a proprietary data set derived from regulatory filings with the Japanese government we test these implications in our empirical analysis of U.S.-Japan agreements. The picture that emerges from the analysis is one of particularly intense but contained knowledge transfer in equity joint ventures, relative to bare license agreements: knowledge transfers directly related to the alliance activity are enhanced in the JV, and the speed of integration into the Japanese firm's subsequent innovations also increases. In marked contrast, leakage of unrelated technology is significantly reduced. These findings suggest that administrative structures that reduce technology leakage are a key feature of the equity joint venture, a result that is inconsistent with a "pure" knowledge-based perspective on alliances.

"Using Hostages to Support Exchange: Dependence Balancing and Equity Ties in Japanese Automotive Supply Relationships," Christina L. Ahmadjian, & Joanne E. Oxley, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 22(1), 2006: 213-233.

We examine the use of partial equity stakes and volume-based dependence balancing in Japanese automotive supply relationships. Building on Williamson's (1983) hostage model, we argue that the robustness of different types of hostage arrangement depends on the value, durability, and observability of the underlying hostages involved. In Japan, strong norms of obligation associated with equity affiliation, along with significant obstacles to equity divestment, make a partial equity stake a robust hostage-based arrangement. Volume-based dependence balancing - whereby an assembler skews purchase quantities towards suppliers that commit more of their capacity to serving that assembler's needs - constitutes a less robust form of hostage in this context. Volume-based dependence balancing may nonetheless be an effective arrangement when contracting hazards are more moderate. Our empirical analysis provides support for these arguments: we find evidence that Japanese auto assemblers hold equity stakes in those suppliers that would otherwise be particularly vulnerable to assembler opportunism; in relationships without equity investments, assemblers systematically manage their purchase volumes in a manner that is also consistent with efforts to make credible commitments to otherwise vulnerable suppliers.

"The Scope and Governance of International R&D Alliances," Joanne E. Oxley & Rachelle C. Sampson, Strategic Management Journal, 25, 2004: 723-749.

Participants in research and development alliances face a difficult challenge: how to maintain sufficiently open knowledge exchange to achieve alliance objectives while controlling knowledge flows to avoid unintended leakage of valuable technology. Prior research suggests that choosing an appropriate organizational form or governance structure is an important mechanism in achieving a balance between these potentially competing concerns. This does not exhaust the set of possible mechanisms available to alliance partners, however. In this paper we explore an alternative response to hazards of R&D cooperation: reduction of the "scope" of the alliance. We argue that when partner firms are direct competitors in end product or strategic resource markets even "protective" governance structures such as equity joint ventures may provide insufficient protection to induce extensive knowledge sharing among alliance participants. Rather than abandoning potential gains from cooperation altogether in these circumstances, partners choose to limit the scope of alliance activities to those that can be successfully completed with limited (and carefully regulated) knowledge sharing. Our arguments are supported by empirical analysis of a sample of international R&D alliances involving electronics and telecommunications equipment companies

"International Franchising Practices in Mexico: Do Franchisors Customize Their Contracts?" Francine Lafontaine & Joanne E. Oxley, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 13, 2004: 95-123.

The contracting practices of franchisors outside their domestic market have received little attention in the empirical literature on franchising to date, largely because of lack of data. We exploit a novel data set that allows us to describe the contracts offered by a number of US and Canadian franchisors operating in Mexico and also compare them to contracts employed at home. Our analyses reveal a series of stylized facts that we hope will prove useful in guiding future empirical and theoretical research on contracting and especially on cross-border contracting practices. These are as follows: (1) The overwhelming majority of franchisors seeking franchisees in Mexico offer exactly the same contract to potential Mexican franchisees as that employed in the home market; (2) Among those franchisors that already have established outlets in Mexico, nearly half use the exact same fees in Mexico and at home; (3) The majority of those franchisors that make changes only alter the fixed fee component of the contract; (4) There is no evidence that franchisors use franchising more or less in Mexico compared to home as an alternative to royalty rate customization in fact, the extent of franchising (versus company-owned units) of these firms in Mexico is not different systematically from that observed in their domestic market or worldwide; and (5) There is no evidence of increased customization over time if anything, the evidence suggests increased similarities in contracting practices over time.