# Putting Your Money Where Their Mouth Is: Financial Advisors' Conflicts of Interest and the Limits of Disclosure

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# **Disclosure: a solution to COIs?**

- Financial regulators advocate disclosure
  - SEC (USA), FSA (UK), AMF (France)
- Medicine
  - American Medical Association, Physician Payment Sunshine Act

# Why is disclosure so popular?

- Consumers make informed decisions
  - Decreases information gap
- Advisors
  - For regulated, often lesser of evils
  - May limit firms' and regulators' liability -- 'Caveat Emptor'
- Perceived to work!

#### But does it?

# **Does disclosure work?**

### Consumers

- Ignore it
- Discount insufficiently or erratically
- Do not seek second opinions
- Feel increased pressure to comply

(Hampson et al. 2006)

(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Cain et al. 2011)

(Foreman, 2001)

(Sah et al. 2013, 2014)

# **Disclosing a conflict of interest**



"Under disclosure rules, I'm required to tell you that I get paid by the fund manager whose investment I'm recommending to you."

# Increased pressure to comply

Advisor discloses:

"I personally gain if you do X rather than Y"

Consumer hears:
"Please do X because it will benefit me"

#### Hypotheses: The burden of disclosure Sah et al. (2013) JPSP

H1: With disclosure, the consumer will trust advice less

 H2: With disclosur pressure to act in



els increased r's disclosed interest



# **Lottery studies**

Sah, S. et al (2013). The Burden of Disclosure: Increased Compliance with Distrusted Advice. *The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. *104*(2),289-304.


- Choosers: pick between two different die roll lotteries, A or B
  - Advisors gave choosers advice on which one was best (A was more attractive)



## **Lottery studies**


- Conflict of Interest: Advisors rewarded if choosers decide to roll inferior die B
  - "Disclosure" condition
  - "No Disclosure" condition
- No-conflict condition

# With C**W**jthd**visdrssgare** biased MORE likely t**catake** biased advice





# **Opposing forces act on chooser**



# Additional studies: reduced pressure

- External Disclosure
- Private decisions
- Opportunity to change mind 'cooling off' period

Sah, S. et al (2013). The Burden of Disclosure: Increased Compliance with Distrusted Advice. *The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. *104*(2),289-304.

Sah, S. et al. Insinuation anxiety: Fear of signaling distrust after conflict of interest disclosures. (June 28, 2014). Available on SSRN.

# **Does disclosure work?**

## Advisors

- Moral licensing
- Strategic exaggeration

(Monin and Miller, 2001; Cain et al. 2011)

# Advisors

Disclosure  $\rightarrow$  advisors more reluctant to expose themselves to COIs so that they have "nothing to declare"?

 Disclosure may work best when it changes the behavior of advisors

Sah, S. & Loewenstein, G. (2014). Nothing to Declare: Mandatory and voluntary disclosure leads advisors to avoid conflicts of interest. *Psychological Science 25(2), 575-584.* 

## **Evidence that...**

- Disclosure can have perverse effects
  - Advisees: Increased pressure (burden of disclosure)
  - Advisors: Increase bias in the advice
- Disclosure can have benefits
  - Advisees: Decreased trust (reduce pressure)
  - Advisees: Increased trust if disclose the absence of COIs
  - Advisors: Advisors reject COIs
  - Advisors: Rein in bias if reminded of obligations

## **Thank You!**

## **Research Papers**

- Sah, S. (2014). Disclosure and strategic restraint: The appropriateness of biased advice in medical and business contexts. *Manuscript in preparation*.
- Sah, S., Loewenstein, G., & Cain, D. (2013). The burden of disclosure: Increased compliance with distrusted advice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 104(2), 289-304.
- Sah, S., et al. (2013). Insinuation anxiety: Increased pressure to follow less trusted advice after disclosure of a conflict of interest. *Working paper. Available on SSRN.*
- Sah, S., & Loewenstein, G. (2014). Nothing to declare: Mandatory and voluntary disclosure leads advisors to avoid conflicts of interest. *Psychological Science 25(2), 575-584.*
- Sah, S., & Read, D. (2014). Consumers are too forgiving towards missing information. *Manuscript in preparation*.
- Sah, S., & Feiler, D. (2014) The disclosure penalty: Negative attributions from conflict of interest disclosure apply to both biased and honest advisors. *Manuscript in preparation*.
- Sah, S. (2012). Conflicts of interest and your physician: Psychological processes that cause unexpected changes in behavior. *Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics*, 40(3), 482-487.

#### Published papers available at <u>www.sunitasah.com/research</u>