February 2021 LongView Metro Inc. Corporate Board Report The David and Sharon Johnston Centre for Corporate Governance Rotman Here's where it changes. Innovation

# **Preface:**

# **Outside the Box**

Welcome to LongView. Your customized report on *Metro Inc.'s* corporate governance disclosure, process and structure.

Over the past 20 years, our researchers have learned that while there is likely no single best practice, good governance is a critical part of long-term, sustainable value creation. **LongView** is an evolution in governance reporting, enabling you to compare elements of *Metro Inc.'s* governance to other issuers at a glance, while moving away from the Johnston Centre's previous judgment-based approach. The Johnston Centre has developed **LongView** reports for every issuer (207) on the S&P/TSX Composite Index (TSX Index).

Access reports on other issuers at www.rotman.utoronto.ca/Johnston.

## Metro Inc. (MRU)

# **Corporate Profile**

		TSX Index Market Ca		Fiscal
Industry:	Market Cap:	Rank:	Region:	Year End:
Consumer Staples	\$14.4 billion	46 / 207	Quebec, Canada	9/29

MRU Ownership Type: Widely-Held

**MRU Size Peer Group:** Market Cap Over \$4.75B\*

\*\$4.75B is the median market capitalization as of January 21, 2021 among our sample of 207 TSX Index companies

Ownership Type Breakdown:	<b>78%</b>	10%	<b>12%</b>
	Widely-Held	Controlled: Single-Class	Controlled: Dual-Class
2020 TSX Index	No shareholder or entity holds shares with at least 30% voting control of the corporation.	A shareholder or a block of related shareholders controls at least 30% of all votes.	At least 30% of all votes are controlled by a shareholder or a block of related shareholders using a share class with superior voting rights.

# **Board Composition**

Boards require the right people with an array of skills and perspectives to advise and oversee the organization. This section provides a snapshot of the salient features of *Metro Inc.* board's composition—size, independence, committee independence, demographics and director tenure—as it compares to other issuers across the TSX Index.

#### **Board Size**

Comparisons

	TSX	Consumer	<b>NA</b> 00
MRU	Index	Staples	Widely-Held
13	9.7 avg	11.0 avg	9.5 avg

#### **Highlights:**

**Board Renewal Practices** 

The Johnston Centre tracks several variables on board renewal. Below you'll find what we learned about Metro Inc.'s renewal policies and the adoption of renewal policies across the TSX Index:

Does MRU have a director term limit?

Yes

29.0% TSX Index Adoption


Does MRU have a director retirement age limit?

Yes

37.2% TSX Index Adoption

#### **Board Size Distribution**

TSX Index in 2020



### **Board Demographic**

**Composition Comparisons** 

Category	MRU	TSX Index	<b>Consumer Staples</b>	Widely-Held
Percentage (number) of Women*	30.8% (4)	28.8%	31.8%	28.4%
Percentage (number) of Aborigina				
Peoples or Visible Minorities*	0% (0)	5.1%	5.4%	4.2%
Average Age	61.8	61.9	61.0	62.1
Average Tenure	6.8	7.4	8.7	6.9
*Peer Group numbers are averages.				

# **Board**

# Independence

There are a multitude of definitions and guidelines around director independence, which can make it difficult to meet everybody's expectations. The Johnston Centre understands that independence involves much more than can be measured on paper. We do, however, gather many variables related to the various relationships that directors might have to a company.

In this section, we summarize what we know about the independence of the *Metro Inc*. board and provide comparisons to other companies on the TSX Index.

#### Metro Inc.

**Board Independence** 

Independent directors: 10 / 13 (76.9%)

CEO/Chair Roles Split: Yes - Independent Chair

<u>Lead Director:</u> No <u>Audit Committee:</u> 5/5 (100%) Independent

Human Resources <u>Committee:</u> 5/5 (100%) Independent

o/ o (100 %) independent

Nominating Committee: 5/5 (100%) Independent

### **Types of Material Relationships**

on TSX Index Boards

Business with the Corporation

21.7% of issuers have board members that are lawyers or other professionals retained by the company, or owners/executives that control a third-party entity engaged in business with the company.

Related Party Executives

15.9% of issuers have an executive from a parent/subsidiary/sister company on the board.

Executives of the Company

**13.5%** of issuers have more than one company executive on the board.

Family Ties

12.1% of issuers are considered family enterprises, with at least one generation of family succession and family members on the board.

### **Board Independence**

**Comparisons** 

Peer Group	Average Board Independence	•	Companies with a Lead Director if Chair is Non-Independent
TSX Index	81.1%	66.2%	85.7%
Consumer Staples	82.2%	54.5%	100.0%
Widely-Held	84.0%	77.0%	89.2%

#### Committee Independence

Comparisons

Peer Group	Audit Committee	Human Resourd Committee	ces Governance Committee	Nominating Committee
TSX Index	99.5%	91.8%	87.9%	89.9%
Consumer Staples	100%	100%	100%	100%
Widely-Held	100%	98.7%	95.6%	97.5%


# Board

# Compensation

This section provides a snapshot of the *Metro Inc*. board's compensation—features, total cost, and pay breakdown—compared against other TSX Index peer groups.


#### Comparisons:

2019 Average Pay per Director



#### TSX Index: Prevalence of Director Share Ownership

**Guidelines as a Multiple of Total Retainer** 



#### Comparisons:

Compensation Breakdown Per Director in 2019



#### Metro Inc.

**Board Compensation Info** 

2019 Average Compensation per Director:	\$118,998	
Director Share Ownership Requirement*:	3x	
2019 Total Board Compensation :	\$1,546,971	
*Multiple of total retainer incl. cash and equity		

### Highlights:

### **Board Compensation**

The Johnston Centre tracks the adoption and disclosure of several corporate governance parameters related to how corporate boards are paid. Below you'll find what we learned about Metro Inc. and adoption rate among Consumer Staples peers (Industry).

Are MRU Directors Required To Hold Shares?	Yes
97.1% Industry Adoption.	
Does MRU Pay Committee Fees?	No
73% Industry Adoption.	
Does MRU Pay Board Meeting Fees?	No
	No
Fees?	No No

# **CEO**

# Compensation

CEO compensation is a key responsibility of the board. Every public board makes different decisions about CEO pay, often motivated by several considerations: recruitment and retention, resource allocation, shareholder concerns, company value and performance, and peer compensation. This section provides a snapshot of the *Metro Inc.* 2019 CEO compensation and characterizes overall pay according to the largest component: cash or equity. Compensation features and breakdown of pay are compared against TSX Index peers.

#### Metro Inc.


#### **CEO Compensation Info & Comparisons**

CEO Total Pay: \$4,599,038	CEO Pay Type: Balanced
Market Cap Over \$4.75B CEO Pay Median:	Consumer Staples CEO Pay Median:
\$7,320,359	\$4,791,011

### **CEO Pay Types: TSX Index in 2019**

Cash Focused	Balanced	Equity Focused
CEO Pay	CEO Pay	CEO Pay
37% of issuers: Cash makes up at least 60% of the CEO's compensation excluding pension.	19% of issuers: Neither cash nor equity make up at least 60% of the CEO's compensation excluding pension.	43% of issuers: Equity awards make up at least 60% of the CEO's compensation excluding pension.

### Comparison: CEO Pay Breakdown in 2019



# Highlights: TSX Index CEO Pay

The Johnston Centre tracked several parameters on the compensation governance of TSX Index companies in 2020. Below we compare *Metro Inc.* to other companies in the Consumer Staples sector (Industry).

Does relative corporate financial performance affect the CEO's bonus at MRU?

0% Industry adoption.

Does MRU disclose bonus metrics linking the CEO's bonus to corporate financial performance?

100% Industry adoption.

Does MRU disclose the weight given to each financial metric affecting the CEO's bonus payout?

100% Industry adoption.

Can MRU's CEO receive no bonus for not meeting targets under the plan?

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

100% Industry adoption.

Does the MRU CEO receive equity awards with performance hurdles that consider relative corporate financial performance?

Yes

81% Industry adoption.

Does MRU disclose a claw-back policy that enables the Board to recoup for reasons that do not require a financial restatement?

Yes

45% Industry adoption.

# **Disclosure**

# **Examples**

In this section, we highlight several areas where companies are less likely to earn maximum points in *The Globe and Mail's* annual corporate board ranking "Board Games". In each area, we indicate the 2020 result for *Metro Inc.* and offer examples of disclosure that meet the criteria for each question, which can be used as optional guides.

#### **Board Games Questions with Low Adoption Rates**

Board Games Question #	MRU Score	TSX Index with max score (%)	References to Examples of Disclosure
7. b) Does the company describe how it considers the representation of women for the board of directors?	2/2	49%	Intact Financial Corp earns full marks, because its circular discloses a board gender diversity policy that includes a target for the representation of women, and shows how the board has surpassed the target.  Reference: Intact Financial Corporation. (2020). Management Information Circular, 60. Retrieved from http://www.intactfc.com/English/investors/financial-reports-and-filings/default.aspx
8. Has the company addressed diversity on its board in areas other than gender?	0/2	2%	Cameco Corp earns full marks, because its circular discloses a diversity policy that requires at least one board member to identify as Indigenous and explains how the requirement has been met.  Reference: Cameco Corporation. (2020). Management Information Circular, 29. Retrieved from https://www.cameco.com/media/media-library/documents/management-proxy-circular
9. Does the board have a system to evaluate its performance?	3/3	59%	Canadian Tire Corp earns full marks, because its circular discloses how board and individual director peer assessments are conducted. Reference: Canadian Tire Corporation. (2020). Management Information Circular, 27-28. Retrieved from https://corp.canadiantire.ca/English/investors/financials-reporting/annual-disclosures/default.aspx
25. Does the company disclose it has a provision to 'claw back' bonus payments to the CEO if wrongdoing is discovered?	2/2	35%	ATCO Ltd earns full marks, because its circular discloses that directors have the discretion to recoup bonus payments if they discover wrongdoing. Several activities constitute wrongdoing, and financial restatement is not required.  Reference: ATCO Ltd. (2020). Management Information Circular, 41. Retrieved from www.atco.com/en-ca/about-us/investors/documents-filings.html
33. Does the company describe how it deals with related-party transactions?	0/2	14%	Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers Inc earns full marks, because its circular discloses the board committee responsible for reviewing related-party transactions, which parties are considered related, and the criteria used to evaluate related-party transactions.  Reference: Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers Incorporated. (2020).  Management Information Circular, 38. Retrieved from https://investor.ritchiebros.com/financials/sec-filings/default.aspx

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