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# LongView

Thomson Reuters Corporation  
Corporate Board Report

**The David and Sharon  
Johnston Centre for  
Corporate Governance  
Innovation**

**Rotman**  
Here's where it changes.

# Preface:

## Outside the Box

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Welcome to LongView. Your customized report on *Thomson Reuters Corporation's* corporate governance disclosure, process and structure.

Over the past 20 years, our researchers have learned that while there is likely no single best practice, good governance is a critical part of long-term, sustainable value creation. LongView is an evolution in governance reporting, enabling you to compare elements of *Thomson Reuters Corporation's* governance to other issuers at a glance, while moving away from the Johnston Centre's previous judgment-based approach. The Johnston Centre has developed LongView reports for every issuer (207) on the S&P/TSX Composite Index (TSX Index).

Access reports on other issuers at [www.rotman.utoronto.ca/Johnston](http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/Johnston).

## Thomson Reuters Corporation (TRI) Corporate Profile

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|                  |                    |                                   |                 |                         |
|------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| <b>Industry:</b> | <b>Market Cap:</b> | <b>TSX Index Market Cap Rank:</b> | <b>Region:</b>  | <b>Fiscal Year End:</b> |
| Industrials      | \$51.6 billion     | 11 / 207                          | Ontario, Canada | 12/31                   |

TRI Ownership Type: Single-Class

TRI Size Peer Group: Market Cap Over \$4.75B\*

\*\$4.75B is the median market capitalization as of January 21, 2021 among our sample of 207 TSX Index companies

|  |  |  |   |
|--|--|--|---|
| <b>Ownership Type Breakdown:</b><br>2020 TSX Index | <b>78%</b><br>Widely-Held  | <b>10%</b><br>Controlled: Single-Class   | <b>12%</b><br>Controlled: Dual-Class  |
|  | No shareholder or entity holds shares with at least 30% voting control of the corporation. | A shareholder or a block of related shareholders controls at least 30% of all votes. | At least 30% of all votes are controlled by a shareholder or a block of related shareholders using a share class with superior voting rights. |

# Board Composition

Boards require the right people with an array of skills and perspectives to advise and oversee the organization. This section provides a snapshot of the salient features of Thomson Reuters Corporation board's composition—size, independence, committee independence, demographics and director tenure—as it compares to other issuers across the TSX Index.

## Board Size Comparisons

| TRI | TSX Index | Industrials | Single-Class |
|-----|-----------|-------------|--------------|
| 12  | 9.7 avg   | 9.3 avg     | 9.9 avg      |

## Highlights: Board Renewal Practices

The Johnston Centre tracks several variables on board renewal. Below you'll find what we learned about Thomson Reuters Corporation's renewal policies and the adoption of renewal policies across the TSX Index:


Does TRI have a director term limit? **No**

29.0% TSX Index Adoption

Does TRI have a director retirement age limit? **No**

37.2% TSX Index Adoption

## Board Size Distribution TSX Index in 2020



## Board Demographic Composition Comparisons

| Category   | TRI       | TSX Index | Industrials | Single-Class |
|--|-----------|-----------|-------------|--------------|
| Percentage (number) of Women*                                    | 16.7% (2) | 28.8%     | 29%         | 28.2%        |
| Percentage (number) of Aboriginal Peoples or Visible Minorities* | 0% (0)    | 5.1%      | 4.3%        | 5%           |
| Average Age  | 62.2      | 61.9      | 62.5        | 60.8         |
| Average Tenure   | 9.5       | 7.4       | 7.0         | 7.3          |

\*Peer Group numbers are averages.

# Board Independence

There are a multitude of definitions and guidelines around director independence, which can make it difficult to meet everybody's expectations. The Johnston Centre understands that independence involves much more than can be measured on paper. We do, however, gather many variables related to the various relationships that directors might have to a company.

In this section, we summarize what we know about the independence of the *Thomson Reuters Corporation* board and provide comparisons to other companies on the TSX Index.

## Thomson Reuters Corporation Board Independence

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>Independent directors:</b><br>7 / 12 (58.3%)              | <b>Audit Committee:</b><br>7/7 (100%) Independent          |
| <b>CEO/Chair Roles Split:</b><br>Yes - Non-Independent Chair | <b>Human Resources Committee:</b><br>4/7 (57%) Independent |
| <b>Lead Director:</b><br>Yes                                 | <b>Nominating Committee:</b><br>3/5 (60%) Independent      |

## Types of Material Relationships on TSX Index Boards

| Business with the Corporation  | Related Party Executives  | Executives of the Company  | Family Ties   |
|--|---|--|---|
| <b>21.7%</b> of issuers have board members that are lawyers or other professionals retained by the company, or owners/executives that control a third-party entity engaged in business with the company. | <b>15.9%</b> of issuers have an executive from a parent/subsidiary/sister company on the board. | <b>13.5%</b> of issuers have more than one company executive on the board. | <b>12.1%</b> of issuers are considered family enterprises, with at least one generation of family succession and family members on the board. |

## Board Independence Comparisons

| Peer Group   | Average Board Independence | Companies with an Independent Chair | Companies with a Lead Director if Chair is Non-Independent |
|--------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| TSX Index    | 81.1%                      | 66.2%                               | 85.7%  |
| Industrials  | 82.5%                      | 80.0%                               | 80.0%  |
| Single-Class | 68.5%                      | 35.0%                               | 61.5%  |


## Committee Independence Comparisons

| Peer Group   | Audit Committee | Human Resources Committee | Governance Committee | Nominating Committee |
|--------------|-----------------|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| TSX Index    | 99.5%           | 91.8%                     | 87.9%                | 89.9%                |
| Industrials  | 96%             | 84%                       | 88%                  | 92%                  |
| Single-Class | 95%             | 45.0%                     | 40.0%                | 55.0%                |

# Board Compensation

This section provides a snapshot of the *Thomson Reuters Corporation* board's compensation—features, total cost, and pay breakdown—compared against other TSX Index peer groups.


## Comparisons: 2019 Average Pay per Director



## TSX Index: Prevalence of Director Share Ownership Guidelines as a Multiple of Total Retainer



## Comparisons: Compensation Breakdown Per Director in 2019



## Thomson Reuters Corporation Board Compensation Info

2019 Average Compensation per Director: \$324,000

Director Share Ownership Requirement\*: 3x

2019 Total Board Compensation : \$3,887,999

\*Multiple of total retainer incl. cash and equity.

## Highlights: Board Compensation

The Johnston Centre tracks the adoption and disclosure of several corporate governance parameters related to how corporate boards are paid. Below you'll find what we learned about Thomson Reuters Corporation and adoption rate among Industrials peers (Industry).

**Are TRI Directors Required to Hold Shares?** **Yes**

97.1% Industry Adoption.

**Does TRI Pay Committee Fees?** **No**

40% Industry Adoption.

**Does TRI Pay Board Meeting Fees?** **No**

16% Industry Adoption.

**Do TRI Directors Receive Options?** **No**

0% Industry Adoption.

# CEO Compensation

CEO compensation is a key responsibility of the board. Every public board makes different decisions about CEO pay, often motivated by several considerations: recruitment and retention, resource allocation, shareholder concerns, company value and performance, and peer compensation. This section provides a snapshot of the *Thomson Reuters Corporation 2019* CEO compensation and characterizes overall pay according to the largest component: cash or equity. Compensation features and breakdown of pay are compared against TSX Index peers.


## Thomson Reuters Corporation CEO Compensation Info & Comparisons

|   |   |
|---|---|
| <b>CEO Total Pay:</b><br>\$19,132,578                             | <b>CEO Pay Type:</b><br>Equity Focused                |
| <b>Market Cap Over \$4.75B<br/>CEO Pay Median:</b><br>\$7,320,359 | <b>Industrials<br/>CEO Pay Median:</b><br>\$4,033,700 |

## CEO Pay Types: TSX Index in 2019

| Cash Focused<br>CEO Pay   | Balanced<br>CEO Pay   | Equity Focused<br>CEO Pay   |
|---|---|---|
| <b>37% of issuers:</b><br>Cash makes up at least 60% of the CEO's compensation excluding pension. | <b>19% of issuers:</b><br>Neither cash nor equity make up at least 60% of the CEO's compensation excluding pension. | <b>43% of issuers:</b><br>Equity awards make up at least 60% of the CEO's compensation excluding pension. |

## Comparison: CEO Pay Breakdown in 2019



## Highlights: TSX Index CEO Pay

The Johnston Centre tracked several parameters on the compensation governance of TSX Index companies in 2020. Below we compare *Thomson Reuters Corporation* to other companies in the Industrials sector (Industry).

**Does relative corporate financial performance affect the CEO's bonus at TRI?** **No**  
0% Industry adoption.

**Does TRI disclose bonus metrics linking the CEO's bonus to corporate financial performance?** **Yes**  
96% Industry adoption.

**Does TRI disclose the weight given to each financial metric affecting the CEO's bonus payout?** **Yes**  
88% Industry adoption.

**Can TRI's CEO receive no bonus for not meeting targets under the plan?** **Yes**  
96% Industry adoption.

**Does the TRI CEO receive equity awards with performance hurdles that consider relative corporate financial performance?** **Yes**  
72% Industry adoption.

**Does TRI disclose a claw-back policy that enables the Board to recoup for reasons that do not require a financial restatement?** **No**  
44% Industry adoption.

# Disclosure Examples

In this section, we highlight several areas where companies are less likely to earn maximum points in *The Globe and Mail's* annual corporate board ranking "Board Games". In each area, we indicate the 2020 result for *Thomson Reuters Corporation* and offer examples of disclosure that meet the criteria for each question, which can be used as optional guides.

## Board Games Questions with Low Adoption Rates

| Board Games Question #   | TRI Score | TSX Index with max score (%) | References to Examples of Disclosure   |
|--|-----------|------------------------------|--|
| 7. b) Does the company describe how it considers the representation of women for the board of directors?               | 1/2       | 49%                          | <b>Intact Financial Corp</b> earns full marks, because its circular discloses a board gender diversity policy that includes a target for the representation of women, and shows how the board has surpassed the target.<br><br><b>Reference:</b> Intact Financial Corporation. (2020). Management Information Circular, 60. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.intactfc.com/English/investors/financial-reports-and-filings/default.aspx">http://www.intactfc.com/English/investors/financial-reports-and-filings/default.aspx</a>                   |
| 8. Has the company addressed diversity on its board in areas other than gender?  | 0/2       | 2%                           | <b>Cameco Corp</b> earns full marks, because its circular discloses a diversity policy that requires at least one board member to identify as Indigenous and explains how the requirement has been met.<br><br><b>Reference:</b> Cameco Corporation. (2020). Management Information Circular, 29. Retrieved from <a href="https://www.cameco.com/media/media-library/documents/management-proxy-circular">https://www.cameco.com/media/media-library/documents/management-proxy-circular</a>   |
| 9. Does the board have a system to evaluate its performance?   | 2/3       | 59%                          | <b>Canadian Tire Corp</b> earns full marks, because its circular discloses how board and individual director peer assessments are conducted.<br><b>Reference:</b> Canadian Tire Corporation. (2020). Management Information Circular, 27-28. Retrieved from <a href="https://corp.canadiantire.ca/English/investors/financials-reporting/annual-disclosures/default.aspx">https://corp.canadiantire.ca/English/investors/financials-reporting/annual-disclosures/default.aspx</a>  |
| 25. Does the company disclose it has a provision to 'claw back' bonus payments to the CEO if wrongdoing is discovered? | 1/2       | 35%                          | <b>ATCO Ltd</b> earns full marks, because its circular discloses that directors have the discretion to recoup bonus payments if they discover wrongdoing. Several activities constitute wrongdoing, and financial restatement is not required.<br><b>Reference:</b> ATCO Ltd. (2020). Management Information Circular, 41. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.atco.com/en-ca/about-us/investors/documents-filings.html">www.atco.com/en-ca/about-us/investors/documents-filings.html</a>   |
| 33. Does the company describe how it deals with related-party transactions?  | 0/2       | 14%                          | <b>Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers Inc</b> earns full marks, because its circular discloses the board committee responsible for reviewing related-party transactions, which parties are considered related, and the criteria used to evaluate related-party transactions.<br><b>Reference:</b> Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers Incorporated. (2020). Management Information Circular, 38. Retrieved from <a href="https://investor.ritchiebros.com/financials/sec-filings/default.aspx">https://investor.ritchiebros.com/financials/sec-filings/default.aspx</a> |

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