February 2021 LongView **WPT Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust** Corporate Board Report The David and Sharon Johnston Centre for Corporate Governance Rotman Here's where it changes.

Innovation

### **Preface:**

## **Outside the Box**

Welcome to LongView. Your customized report on WPT Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust's corporate governance disclosure, process and structure.

Over the past 20 years, our researchers have learned that while there is likely no single best practice, good governance is a critical part of long-term, sustainable value creation. **LongView** is an evolution in governance reporting, enabling you to compare elements of WPT Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust's governance to other issuers at a glance, while moving away from the Johnston Centre's previous judgment-based approach. The Johnston Centre has developed **LongView** reports for every issuer (207) on the S&P/TSX Composite Index (TSX Index).

Access reports on other issuers at www.rotman.utoronto.ca/Johnston.

### WPT Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust (WIR.UN)

### **Corporate Profile**

		TSX Index Market Cap		Fiscal
Industry:	Market Cap:	Rank:	Region:	Year End:
Real Estate	\$1.7 billion	178 / 207	Minnesota, USA	12/31

WIR.UN Ownership Type: Widely-Held

WIR.UN Size Peer Group: Market Cap Under \$4.75B\*

\*\$4.75B is the median market capitalization as of January 21, 2021 among our sample of 207 TSX Index companies

Ownership Type Breakdown:	<b>78%</b>	10%	<b>12%</b>
	Widely-Held	Controlled: Single-Class	Controlled: Dual-Class
2020 TSX Index	No shareholder or entity holds shares with at least 30% voting control of the corporation.	A shareholder or a block of related shareholders controls at least 30% of all votes.	At least 30% of all votes are controlled by a shareholder or a block of related shareholders using a share class with superior voting rights.

# Board Composition

Boards require the right people with an array of skills and perspectives to advise and oversee the organization. This section provides a snapshot of the salient features of WPT Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust board's composition—size, independence, committee independence, demographics and director tenure—as it compares to other issuers across the TSX Index.

#### **Board Size**

Comparisons

WIR.UN	TSX Index	Real Estate	Widely-Held
7	9.7 avg	8.3 avg	9.5 avg

#### **Highlights:**

**Board Renewal Practices** 

The Johnston Centre tracks several variables on board renewal. Below you'll find what we learned about WPT Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust's renewal policies and the adoption of renewal policies across the TSX Index:

Does WIR.UN have a director term limit?

No

29.0% TSX Index Adoption


Does WIR.UN have a director retirement age limit?

No

37.2% TSX Index Adoption

#### **Board Size Distribution**

TSX Index in 2020



#### **Board Demographic**

**Composition Comparisons** 

Category	WIR.UN	TSX Index	Real Estate	Widely-Held	
Percentage (number) of Women*	28.6% (2)	28.8%	28.9%	28.4%	
Percentage (number) of Aborigina	Percentage (number) of Aboriginal				
Peoples or Visible Minorities*	0% (0)	5.1%	2.4%	4.2%	
Average Age	62.9	61.9	62.0	62.1	
Average Tenure	5.8	7.4	7.9	6.9	
*Peer Group numbers are averages.					

# **Board**

# Independence

There are a multitude of definitions and guidelines around director independence, which can make it difficult to meet everybody's expectations. The Johnston Centre understands that independence involves much more than can be measured on paper. We do, however, gather many variables related to the various relationships that directors might have to a company.

In this section, we summarize what we know about the independence of the WPT Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust board and provide comparisons to other companies on the TSX Index.

# WPT Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust

**Board Independence** 

**Independent directors:** 

6 / 7 (85.7%)

**Audit Committee:** 

3/3 (100%) Independent

**CEO/Chair Roles Split:** 

Nc

Human Resources Committee:

3/3 (100%) Independent

**Lead Director:** 

Yes

Nominating Committee: 3/3 (100%) Independent

#### **Types of Material Relationships**

on TSX Index Boards

Business with the Corporation

21.7% of issuers have board members that are lawyers or other professionals retained by the company, or owners/executives that control a third-party entity engaged in business with the company.

Related Party Executives

15.9% of issuers have an executive from a parent/subsidiary/sister company on the board.

**Executives of the Company** 

**13.5%** of issuers have more than one company executive on the board.

Family Ties

12.1% of issuers are considered family enterprises, with at least one generation of family succession and family members on the board.

#### **Board Independence**

**Comparisons** 

Peer Group	Average Board Independence		Companies with a Lead Director if Chair is Non-Independent
TSX Index	81.1%	66.2%	85.7%
Real Estate	80.7%	72.7%	100.0%
Widely-Held	84.0%	77.0%	89.2%

#### Committee Independence

Comparisons

_	Audit		ces Governance	Nominating
Peer Group	Committee	Committee	Committee	Committee
TSX Index	99.5%	91.8%	87.9%	89.9%
Real Estate	100%	100%	100%	100%
Widely-Held	100%	98.7%	95.6%	97.5%

### Board

# Compensation

This section provides a snapshot of the WPT Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust board's compensation—features, total cost, and pay breakdown—compared against other TSX Index peer groups.


#### Comparisons:

2019 Average Pay per Director




#### TSX Index: Prevalence of Director Share Ownership

**Guidelines as a Multiple of Total Retainer** 



#### Comparisons:

**Compensation Breakdown Per Director in 2019** 



# WPT Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust

**Board Compensation Info** 

2019 Average Compensation per Director:	\$113,095
Director Share Ownership Requirement*:	2x
2019 Total Board	
Compensation :	\$791,664
*Multiple of total retai	ner incl. cash and equity.

#### **Highlights:**

### **Board Compensation**

The Johnston Centre tracks the adoption and disclosure of several corporate governance parameters related to how corporate boards are paid. Below you'll find what we learned about WPT Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust and adoption rate among Real Estate peers (Industry).

Are WIR.UN Directors Required To Hold Shares?	Yes
89.2% Industry Adoption.	
Does WIR.UN Pay Committee	
Fees?	Yes
45% Industry Adoption.	
Does WIR.UN Pay Board	
Does WIR.UN Pay Board Meeting Fees?	Yes
•	Yes
Meeting Fees?	Yes
Meeting Fees? 55% Industry Adoption.	Yes

## **CEO**

# Compensation

CEO compensation is a key responsibility of the board. Every public board makes different decisions about CEO pay, often motivated by several considerations: recruitment and retention, resource allocation, shareholder concerns, company value and performance, and peer compensation. This section provides a snapshot of the WPT Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust 2019 CEO compensation and characterizes overall pay according to the largest component: cash or equity. Compensation features and breakdown of pay are compared against TSX Index peers.

### WPT Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust

**CEO Compensation Info & Comparisons** 

CEO Total Pay:	CEO Pay Type:
\$2,526,745	Cash Focused

Market Cap Under \$4.75B CEO Pay Median:


Real Estate
CEO Pay Median:

\$2,941,812 \$2,721,080

#### **CEO Pay Types: TSX Index in 2019**

Cash Focused CEO Pay	Balanced CEO Pay	Equity Focused CEO Pay
37% of issuers: Cash makes up at least 60% of the CEO's compensation excluding pension.	19% of issuers: Neither cash nor equity make up at least 60% of the CEO's compensation excluding pension.	43% of issuers: Equity awards make up at least 60% of the CEO's compensation excluding pension.

#### Comparison: CEO Pay Breakdown in 2019



# Highlights: TSX Index CEO Pay

The Johnston Centre tracked several parameters on the compensation governance of TSX Index companies in 2020. Below we compare WPT Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust to other companies in the Real Estate sector (Industry).

Does relative corporate financial performance affect the CEO's bonus at WIR.UN?

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

18% Industry adoption.

Does WIR.UN disclose bonus metrics linking the CEO's bonus to corporate financial performance?

90% Industry adoption.

Does WIR.UN disclose the weight given to each financial metric affecting the CEO's bonus payout?

59% Industry adoption.

Can WIR.UN's CEO receive no bonus

for not meeting targets under the plan?

68% Industry adoption.

Does the WIR.UN CEO receive equity awards with performance hurdles that consider relative corporate financial performance?

63% Industry adoption.

Does WIR.UN disclose a claw-back policy that enables the Board to recoup for reasons that do not require a financial restatement?

22% Industry adoption.

# **Disclosure**

# **Examples**

In this section, we highlight several areas where companies are less likely to earn maximum points in *The Globe and Mail's* annual corporate board ranking "Board Games". In each area, we indicate the 2020 result for *WPT Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust* and offer examples of disclosure that meet the criteria for each question, which can be used as optional guides.

#### **Board Games Questions with Low Adoption Rates**

Board Games Question #	WIR.UN Score	TSX Index with max score (%)	References to Examples of Disclosure
7. b) Does the company describe how it considers the representation of women for the board of directors?	0/2	49%	Intact Financial Corp earns full marks, because its circular discloses a board gender diversity policy that includes a target for the representation of women, and shows how the board has surpassed the target.  Reference: Intact Financial Corporation. (2020). Management Information Circular, 60. Retrieved from http://www.intactfc.com/English/investors/financial-reports-and-filings/default.aspx
8. Has the company addressed diversity on its board in areas other than gender?	0/2	2%	Cameco Corp earns full marks, because its circular discloses a diversity policy that requires at least one board member to identify as Indigenous and explains how the requirement has been met.  Reference: Cameco Corporation. (2020). Management Information Circular, 29. Retrieved from https://www.cameco.com/media/media-library/documents/management-proxy-circular
9. Does the board have a system to evaluate its performance?	2/3	59%	Canadian Tire Corp earns full marks, because its circular discloses how board and individual director peer assessments are conducted. Reference: Canadian Tire Corporation. (2020). Management Information Circular, 27-28. Retrieved from https://corp.canadiantire.ca/English/investors/financials-reporting/annual-disclosures/default.aspx
25. Does the company disclose it has a provision to 'claw back' bonus payments to the CEO if wrongdoing is discovered?	1/2	35%	ATCO Ltd earns full marks, because its circular discloses that directors have the discretion to recoup bonus payments if they discover wrongdoing. Several activities constitute wrongdoing, and financial restatement is not required.  Reference: ATCO Ltd. (2020). Management Information Circular, 41. Retrieved from www.atco.com/en-ca/about-us/investors/documents-filings.html
33. Does the company describe how it deals with related-party transactions?	0/2	14%	Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers Inc earns full marks, because its circular discloses the board committee responsible for reviewing related-party transactions, which parties are considered related, and the criteria used to evaluate related-party transactions.  Reference: Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers Incorporated. (2020).  Management Information Circular, 38. Retrieved from https://investor.ritchiebros.com/financials/sec-filings/default.aspx

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