Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto

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Sir Paul Tucker on "Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State"

7:15-7:59am check-in, coffee; 8:00am sharp to 9:00am presentation and Q&A; 9:00-9:10am book sale

Event Details

Speaker Series

Unelected Power Book Cover
Date: Monday April 08, 2019 | 08:00 AM - 09:00 AM
Speaker(s): Guest Speaker: Sir Paul Tucker, Chair – Systemic Risk Council; Research Fellow – Harvard Kennedy School’s Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government; former Deputy Governor, Bank of England (2009-13); Author

In Conversation With: David Dyzenhaus, University Professor of Law and Philosophy, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto
Topic: "Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State" (by Paul Tucker, Princeton University Press, 2018)
Venue: Classroom LL1035 (Lower Level, South Building) | map
Rotman School of Management, U of Toronto, 
105 St George Street
Location: Toronto
Cost: $43.99 plus HST per person (includes one hardcover copy of "Unelected Power", one seat for the session and coffee)
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Synopsis: Over the past quarter century, more and more big public policy decisions have been delegated by elected legislators to agencies insulated from day-to-day politics. The most obvious examples are the central banks, which emerged from the global financial crisis as a third great pillar of unelected power alongside the judiciary and the military. But, wider than that, many of our laws are now made by independent regulators, and the judicial tribunals that oversee them. It matters whether this form of governance squares with our deep political values: democracy, the rule of law, and constitutionalism.

Paul Tucker argues in Unelected Power that the problem is serious, contributing to a creeping sense of alienation from our system of government, and that it reveals a gap in constitutionalism. While defending the idea that independent agencies can help political communities commit to the public good, he advocates that constitutional democracies should adopt clearer principles on the delegation of power to unelected technocrats.

Unelected Power suggests how that could be done, blending economics, political theory and public law, and drawing examples from the United States, Britain, France, Germany and the European Union. Tucker concludes that the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and that central bankers should emulate the best of judicial self-restraint, becoming a model of dispersed power.

Questions: | Daniel Ellul | 416-978-6119

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